Improving the Fitness Inquiry of the North Carolina Bar Application by Hubbard, Ann
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 81 | Number 6 Article 2
9-1-2003
Improving the Fitness Inquiry of the North
Carolina Bar Application
Ann Hubbard
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ann Hubbard, Improving the Fitness Inquiry of the North Carolina Bar Application, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 2179 (2003).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol81/iss6/2
IMPROVING THE FITNESS INQUIRY OF THE
NORTH CAROLINA BAR APPLICATION
ANN HUBBARD
The North Carolina Bar has been in the forefront of nationwide
efforts to reduce lawyer impairment by educating lawyers to
recognize and respond to the symptoms of mental disorders and
by providing confidential support and assistance for lawyers
coping with those disorders. The Bar's approach rests on two
sound principles. First, the proper concern is professional
impairment, not diagnosis of or treatment for mental disorders.
Second, the key to avoiding professional impairment is early
treatment, and the key to encouraging early treatment is
confidentiality. These widely accepted principles hold equally true
for bar applicants as for bar members, but in North Carolina, they
are not equally applied. To this day, an applicant to the North
Carolina Bar must disclose intensely personal details about her
lifetime history of counseling or other mental health treatment,
including treatment or episodes that are long passed or that reflect
only how she feels, not how she currently functions, much less
how she would function as a lawyer.
This far-reaching mental health inquiry is counterproductive. It is
also illegal. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 prohibits
professional licensing boards from asking about an applicant's
mental health conditions or treatment unless the questions are
necessary to determine the applicant's current professional
impairment. Past diagnoses and treatment do not reflect current
impairment, and even current diagnoses and treatment may reflect
personal striving or distress, not professional impairment, or any
impairment at all. Accordingly, federal courts uniformly have
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condemned bar application questions like North Carolina's, and
many state bars and licensing boards have revised their bar
applications to narrow or even eliminate mental health inquiries.
This circumscribed approach has been advanced by the American
Bar Association, the National Conference of Bar Examiners, the
Association of American Law Schools and the American
Psychiatric Association. A decade after the passage of the ADA,
North Carolina is one of a dwindling number of states still
clinging to the discredited far-reaching questions. As members of
the North Carolina Bar, we should actively support revising the
bar application to conform to the law and to reflect the Bar's
commitment to reducing lawyer impairment by removing any
stigma or penalty from an applicant's responsible decision to seek
the help necessary to maintain sound mental health and competent
professional functioning.
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FITNESS AND THE BAR APPLICATION
INTRODUCTION
A lawyer in North Carolina who is struggling with substance
abuse, depression, or the familiar stress of balancing personal needs
and professional demands enjoys a guarantee of confidential support
and counseling. The North Carolina Bar ("Bar"), through its Lawyer
Assistance Program, promises peer support, counseling, and other
services to help her maintain or regain her functioning without
jeopardizing her clients or her practice Critical to this effort is the
promise of confidentiality: nothing revealed to the Lawyer
Assistance Program is disclosed to bar disciplinary officials.2 A
lawyer thus has every incentive-and no penalty-for seeking early
treatment for actual or imminent impairment.
A law student in North Carolina who is struggling with substance
abuse, depression, or the stress of balancing personal needs and
academic demands is not so fortunate. The Bar, through the Board of
Law Examiners of North Carolina ("Board"), will require that she
disclose any counseling or other treatment in her application to the
Bar. Indeed, the current bar application questions require the law
student to give a full accounting of every time she has sought mental
health treatment at any point in her life, whether for depression,
stress, the trauma of sexual abuse, or the loss of a relationship.' She
thus faces a difficult choice. If she seeks treatment, she will have to
make personal and often painful disclosures to bar authorities. If she
forgoes treatment, she finds no relief from her current distress and
her condition may worsen. Or she may pursue a risky third option:
seek the treatment, but decline to disclose it, even though this lack of
candor raises questions about whether she has the "good moral
character" required for bar admission.4
1. North Carolina Lawyer Assistance Program, What We Do, at http://
www.nclap.org/whatwedo.asp (last visited June 10, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
2. See N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 27, r. 1D.0613 (June 2002).
3. The questions ask, among other things: "Have you ever been impaired.., or have
you ever been told that you were impaired as a result of any medical, surgical, or
psychiatric condition? ... Have you ever been involuntarily committed to any ...
outpatient mental health ... facility for treatment or evaluation? ... Have you ever been
admitted at the request of any person other than yourself, to any ... outpatient mental
health.., facility for treatment or evaluation?" BD. OF LAW EXAM'RS OF THE STATE OF
N.C., APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE NORTH CAROLINA BAR EXAMINATION 20-
22 (April 2003) [hereinafter N.C. BAR APPLICATION] (General Application),
http://www.ncble.org (last visited May 10, 2003) (on file with North Carolina Law
Review).
4. See BD. OF LAW EXAM'RS OF THE STATE OF N.C., RULES GOVERNING
ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA., Rule
20031 2181
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This double standard regarding mental health treatment for bar
members and bar applicants is misguided and counterproductive.5
For bar members, the promise of confidentiality promotes mental
health maintenance by encouraging early treatment, which reduces
lawyer impairment and thereby protects the public. 6  For bar
applicants, the requirement of disclosure discourages the same
treatment, thereby increasing their risk of immediate or even long-
term impairment. Indeed, by equating mental health treatment with
a lack of "character and fitness," mental health questions only
reinforce the biggest obstacle to obtaining needed treatment: the
stigma.7
Invasive mental health questions also run afoul of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 19908 ("ADA"), which prohibits professional
licensing agencies from making unwarranted inquiries into actual or
perceived disabilities.9 Under the ADA, a licensing board that wishes
.0501(1) [hereinafter N.C. RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION], http://www.ncble.orgl
RULES.htm#REQUIREMENTS (last visited July 13, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); Stanley S. Herr, Questioning the Questionnaires: Bar Admissions
and Candidates with Disabilities, 42 VILL. L. REV. 635, 658 (1997) (describing bar
applicants' "tormenting" choices: "divulge information that might be protected from
disclosure under the ADA, unilaterally interpret ambiguous terms to shield themselves
from disclosing disability conditions and treatment or give evasive, if not untruthful
answers").
5. Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J.
491, 583 (1985). Professor Rhode aptly denounces this double standard:
[Forcing individuals] to choose between developing adequate therapeutic
relationships and minimizing certification difficulties is not readily justified given
the limited value of the information likely to be provided. That licensed
attorneys undergoing treatment are not forced to make comparable tradeoffs,
despite the temporally more relevant nature of any disclosures, again
underscores the perversity of current procedures.
Id.
6. See tit. 27, r. 1D.0601. The North Carolina Administrative Code states that:
[tihe purpose of the lawyer assistance is to (1) protect the public by assisting
lawyers and judges who are professionally impaired by reason of substance
abuse, addiction, or debilitating mental condition; (2) assist impaired lawyers and
judges in recovery; and (3) educate lawyers and judges concerning the causes of
and remedies for such impairment.
Id.
7. See SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. AND NAT'L
INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 3, 8 (1999) [hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL'S
REPORT] (declaring stigma to be the "most formidable obstacle" to progress on mental
illness and one of the barriers to seeking treatment), http://www.surgeongeneral.
gov/library/mentalhealth/home.html (last visited July 2, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000).
9. See discussion infra Part I.D.
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to ask questions related to mental disorders or psychological
treatment must demonstrate that those questions are both effective at
identifying unfit applicants and necessary to the board's objective of
protecting the public from unfit practitioners."° Significantly, the
board must show that the questions are relevant to the applicant's
current fitness to practice law." Questions about illness or treatment
remote in time or about recent conditions that might warrant
treatment, but do not impair the applicant's ability to practice law,
are not permissible. 2 The ADA has prompted many states to
narrow, or even eliminate, mental health questions on their bar
applications. 3
The last decade has produced a growing legal and professional
consensus supporting the elimination of far-reaching mental health
inquiries on bar applications. Federal courts have uniformly
condemned questions about a bar applicant's lifetime history of
mental illness or treatment-the "have you ever" questions-as
unnecessarily broad, ineffective at identifying problem attorneys, and
not helpful, much less necessary, to protect the public or reduce
lawyer impairment. 4 They have also invalidated, on similar grounds,
questions about recent or even current conditions or treatment that
have no relevance to an applicant's present fitness to practice law. 5
In 1994, the American Bar Association called on bar examiners to
renounce broad questions about treatment in favor of narrowly
tailored questions focusing on an applicant's behavior, conduct, or
current impairment. 6 The following year, the National Conference of
10. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
11. H. Rutherford Turnbull III et. al., American Bar Association Bar Admissions
Resolution: Narrow Limits for Questions Related to the Mental Health and Treatment of
Bar Applicants, 18 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 597, 597 (1994) [hereinafter
ABA Resolution]; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, RESOURCE DOCUMENT: GUIDELINES
CONCERNING DISCLOSURE AND CONFIDENTIALITY 1 (1997) [hereinafter APA
GUIDELINES], http://www.psych.org/archives/970015.pdf (last visited May 10, 2003) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
12. See infra notes 88-113 and accompanying text.
13. See Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 440 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(observing that at least eight states had revised their mental health questions in the face of
actual or potential litigation under the ADA); id. at 438 & n.15 (listing former mental
health questions from five states that no longer asked such questions).
14. See discussion infra Part I.D.
15. See, e.g., Doe v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of
Fla., 906 F. Supp. 1534, 1544-45 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (prohibiting the use of questions that
could require the disclosure of family counseling or treatment in response to personal
traumas such as sexual abuse or loss of a loved one).
16. ABA Resolution, supra note 11, at 598 (denouncing the use of questions that
"yield information of questionable value at the expense of discouraging prospective
applicants from seeking needed help").
2003] 2183
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Bar Examiners ("NCBE") revised its own application form, which
serves as a model for many state bars, by replacing "have you ever"
questions with more narrowly tailored inquiries.17
Despite this consensus among the federal judiciary and national
bar officials and bar examiners, the North Carolina bar application
still asks mental health questions that are staggering in their scope.
These include "have you ever" questions about outpatient treatment
or evaluation, actual or alleged impairment, and psychiatric
diagnoses. 8 The applicant who answers "yes" to one of these
triggering questions also must authorize the release of any and all
records related to his evaluation, diagnoses, or treatment. 9
This Article argues that the Board and the Bar should make it a
priority to reexamine both the legality and the wisdom of asking
intrusive mental health questions. The legal argument is
straightforward: under the ADA, the Board may ask only those
health- or disability-related questions that are demonstrably necessary
to protect the public from applicants who are "unfit" to practice law.
There is, however, no evidence that information about past mental
health diagnoses or treatment is necessary or even useful to identify
unfit applicants.2"
By far the best predictor of how an applicant will function as a
lawyer is how she has functioned to date-that is, her conduct."
Fittingly, the North Carolina bar application asks exhaustive
questions about every facet of an applicant's conduct in school, at
work, and in the community.2  Experience shows that some aspect of
that conduct (arrests, unpaid debts, academic discipline and the like)
will almost always alert bar examiners to any impairment that
compromises an applicant's ability to practice law.23 This casts serious
doubt on the need to ask status questions, including status as a person
with a diagnosed mental disorder and status as a past or present
17. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM'RS, REQUEST FOR PREPARATION OF A
CHARACTER REPORT 12 (2002) [hereinafter NCBE CHARACTER REPORT],
http://www.ncbex.org/character/Standard01.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2003) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
18. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
19. N.C. BAR APPLICATION, supra note 3, at 1 (Authorization and Release).
20. See APA GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 1 ("Prior psychiatric treatment is, per se,
not relevant to the question of current impairment.").
21. Phyllis Coleman & Ronald A. Shellow, Ask About Conduct, Not Mental Illness: A
Proposal for Bar Examiners and Medical Boards to Comply with the ADA and
Constitution, 20 J. LEGIS. 147, 149, 152-55 (1994).
22. See N.C. BAR APPLICATION, supra note 3, at 7-19 (General Application).
23. Charles L. Reischel, The Constitution, the Disability Act, and Questions About
Alcoholism, Addiction, and Mental Health, 61 B. EXAMINER 10, 20-21 (Aug. 1992).
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consumer of mental health services. If such status questions provide
only scant (if any) marginal benefit, they are neither effective nor
necessary for identifying unfit practitioners and therefore violate the
ADA.24
The factors that make these questions illegal under the ADA
also make them unwise and ineffective as a long-term strategy for
reducing lawyer impairment. Requiring the disclosure of mental
health treatment, which concerns private and often painful matters,
penalizes and stigmatizes applicants with the wisdom and maturity to
seek needed treatment. This penalty deters other prospective
applicants from acknowledging and responding to signs of mental or
emotional distress by seeking appropriate care. At worst, law
students and other applicants who fail to seek treatment may suffer
serious setbacks in their health, well-being, and personal and
professional satisfaction. At best, they miss an important opportunity
to obtain treatment and develop skills that will help them cope with
the stresses and challenges of law practice. As a result, mental health
status questions that discourage or stigmatize mental health treatment
lead to greater lawyer impairment, not less. Moreover, the bar
application process should reflect and reinforce some of the shared
values and expectations of the profession, including respect for the
law, the principle of nondiscrimination, and the importance of
personal and professional responsibility to address impairments that
could injure clients' interests." Asking questions that clearly violate
the ADA and stigmatize mental health treatment undermines the
Bar's moral authority and fuels the very prejudices the ADA is
intended to dispel.26
This Article urges the prompt review and revision of the mental
health questions on the North Carolina bar application and offers
proposals for that reform. Part I provides the necessary background
for assessing the validity of mental health inquiries under the ADA.
After a brief overview of concerns about mental disorders in the legal
profession and the role of character and fitness reviews, it presents
the basic requirements of Title II of the ADA with respect to mental
24. See discussion infra Part II.A.
25. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 509.
26. See Jon Bauer, The Character of the Questions and the Fitness of the Process:
Mental Health, Bar Admissions and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 49 UCLA L. REV.
93, 96 (2001) ("If discriminatory attitudes infect the process established by bench and bar
to determine who may serve as a lawyer, there is reason to doubt the legal system's fitness
to carry out the ADA's mandate, and the character of its commitment to the
nondiscrimination ideal.").
2003] 2185
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fitness inquiries by licensing boards. Part II then traces a decade of
judicial and professional pronouncements on the legality and
effectiveness of mental health inquiries on bar applications. This
account reveals the emergence of a consensus on two points. First,
far-reaching questions about an applicant's mental health or
treatment history are prohibited by the ADA. Second, they are
unsound as a means to reduce lawyer impairment and protect the
public.
Part III sets forth options for reform in North Carolina,
examining the process for reform, the overarching principles that
should guide reform, and specific proposals that reformers might
choose to consider. Section A, drawing from reform efforts in other
states, calls for a reform process committed to open-minded
collaboration to achieve consensus among members of the Board, the
bar, and the bench. The proper aim of this cooperative effort should
be to tailor a fitness screening process that best serves North
Carolina's objective of reducing lawyer impairment, not merely to
fashion a process that passes muster under the ADA.
Section B of Part III identifies three cardinal principles that
should steer reform. First, reformers must never lose sight of the
necessity requirement, which prohibits mental health status questions
unless bar examiners can show that they are necessary to detect unfit
applicants whom conduct-based questions fail to detect. Second, the
fitness screening should be tailored to serve two complementary
objectives: the immediate objective of ensuring that new members of
the bar are mentally and emotionally fit to practice law and the long-
term goal of developing a screening process that reflects the bar's
commitment to reducing lawyer impairment by educating lawyers
about impairment and recovery and encouraging them to seek early
treatment for mental or emotional problems. Third, any fitness
inquiry should be incremental and carefully structured to seek only
that information that is needed, only from whom it is needed, and
only when it is needed-that is, an incremental, focused, and
sequenced inquiry.
Following this discussion of the process and general principles
that should inform any effort to revise the fitness inquiry, Section C
of Part III turns to specific proposals for revising or eliminating the
Bar's current mental health questions. These range from the
minimalist-tucking and trimming to conform to the ADA-to the
ambitious-asking no mental health questions unless and until the
applicant's conduct raises fitness concerns. The Article concludes
that the most principled approach is also the most promising one: to
2186 [Vol. 81
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focus on the applicant's past conduct as the principal-if not sole-
indicator of her future conduct as a lawyer.
I. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
A. Mental Disorders and the Practice of Law
Mental disorders are prevalent in America and in the legal
profession. Nearly half of all Americans will experience some
diagnosable mental disorder at some point in their lives.27 For one in
five Americans, that disorder will be depression.28 For lawyers, that
number is considerably higher.29 One study showed that lawyers were
3.6 times more likely than other full-time professionals to experience
depression.3" Because depression and other mental disorders may
arise-or recur-at any point in a lawyer's career, even the most
capable and experienced attorney may face impairment. Untreated
or uncontrolled, mental disorders can wreak havoc on a lawyer's life
and jeopardize his clients' interests."
27. Ronald C. Kessler et al., Lifetime and 12-Month Prevalence of DSM-III-R
Psychiatric Disorders in the United States, 51 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 8, 11 (1994).
28. Id. at 10.
29. See G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Prevalence of Depression, Alcohol Abuse,
and Cocaine Abuse Among United States Lawyers, 13 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 233, 240-
41 (1990) (finding that lawyers in the State of Washington experienced symptoms of
depression or substance abuse at a rate double the national average for the general
population).
30. William W. Eaton et al., Occupations and the Prevalence of Major Depressive
Disorder, 32 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 1079, 1083 (1990).
31. A lawyer with untreated depression, for example, may become unable to
concentrate, think clearly, make sound decisions, meet deadlines, or communicate with
others, including clients, opposing counsel and court officials. See Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar
Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 436 (E.D. Va. 1995) (noting "cases of acute mental disability
among lawyers [that] resulted in license suspensions" demonstrated that "untreated
mental or emotional illness may result in injury to clients"); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 320-45 (4th ed. 1994)
[hereinafter DSM-IV] (describing symptoms and forms of mood disorders such as
depression). For rich, first-person accounts of how debilitating depression can be, see
generally ANDREW SOLOMON, NOONDAY DEMON: AN ATLAS OF DEPRESSION (2001)
(chronicling the author's recurrent depression); WILLIAM STYRON, DARKNESS VISIBLE:
A MEMOIR OF MADNESS (1990) (describing author's debilitation and recovery from
depression); UNHOLY GHOST: WRITERS ON DEPRESSION (Nell Casey ed., 2001)
(collecting essays on depression). Moreover, depression may lead to or coincide with
alcohol abuse. See SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S.
DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE PREVENTION AND
TREATMENT OF CO-OCCURRING SUBSTANCE ABUSE DISORDERS AND MENTAL
DISORDERS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2002) (citing government statistics showing that
seven to ten million Americans have co-occurring substance abuse and mental disorders
and that roughly half of all persons with a lifetime history of a mental disorder also have a
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Mental disorders, however; are more treatable than ever. Recent
advances in psychiatry, neurology, and pharmacology have produced
medications that relieve more of the symptoms of conditions like
anxiety disorders, depression, and bipolar disorder, with fewer side
effects, thereby allowing more people with these conditions to
function well in their professional and personal lives.3z Knowledge
about the etiology and prevalence of mental disorders has
contributed to a growing recognition that mental illness is a public
health problem,33 not a personal failing or, worse, a character flaw.
Despite this increased knowledge, the stigma of mental disorders
persists. In one study, respondents described a typical man with
mental illness as "dangerous, dirty, unpredictable, and worthless."34
Stigma presents a "formidable obstacle" to progress in the treatment
of mental illness.35 Nearly two-thirds of all Americans with a
diagnosable mental disorder do not seek treatment.36 One challenge
for state bars and their licensing organizations is to identify those few
bar applicants whose mental disorders will impair their ability to
function competently as lawyers, without stigmatizing the far greater
number of applicants who have past or present mental disorders that
do not impair their fitness to practice law.
B. Defining and Measuring Fitness to Practice Law
The North Carolina legislature created the Board "[f]or the
purpose of examining applicants and providing rules and regulations
for admission to the Bar .... ,3 The Board is authorized to conduct
investigations as it deems necessary "to satisfy it that the applicants
for admission to the Bar possess the qualifications of character and
lifetime history of a substance abuse disorder), http://samhsa.gov/reports/congress
2002/execsummary.htm (last visited May 13, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); Connie J.A. Beck et al., Lawyer Distress: Alcohol-Related Programs and Other
Psychological Concerns Among a Sample of Practicing Lawyers, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 1-3
(1.995-96) (citing symptoms of distress that make a lawyer vulnerable to alcohol abuse).
32. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 7, at 9, 13-14 (discussing advances in
medical understanding of mental disorders and increased effectiveness in their treatment);
id. at 64-65 (discussing "armamentarium of efficacious treatments" that are particularly
effective in combination).
33. See id. at 1.
34. Bruce G. Link et al., Public Conceptions of Mental Illness: Labels, Causes,
Dangerousness, and Social Distance, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1328, 1328 (1999) (observing
that "[r]ather than waning ... stereotypes of dangerousness are actually on the increase"
and that "the stigma of mental illness remains a powerfully detrimental feature of the lives
of people with such conditions" (citations omitted)).
35. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 7, at 3.
36. Id. at 8.
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-24 (2001).
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general fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor at law .... 38
Pursuant to this authority, the Board requires that an applicant
"possess the qualifications of character and general fitness requisite
for an attorney and counselor-at-law and be of good moral character
and entitled to the high regard and confidence of the public ....
Thus, the Board conducts character and fitness reviews to protect the
public from unscrupulous, unprofessional, or unfit lawyers.
Each state bar defines for itself the knowledge, skills, character
traits, and personal qualities that make a competent lawyer. "Good
moral character" and "fitness" are common requisites.40 "Good
moral character" encompasses personal qualities such as honesty,
reliability, fairness, and respect for the rights of others.4" "Fitness,"
properly understood, refers to the absence of any physical or mental
condition, disease, or disorder that impairs a lawyer's ability to
practice law competently and to protect her clients' interests.42
Unfortunately, bar examiners often fail to appreciate the
fundamental differences between a person's "character" (her moral
or ethical fiber) and her "fitness" (the condition of her health) as they
conduct investigations commonly known as "character and fitness"
reviews. 43  The bar applications themselves often conflate the two
criteria through the definitions or juxtapositions of character and
38. Id.
39. N.C. RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION, supra note 4, Rule .0501(1).
40. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM'RS, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR
ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 2003, at 6 [hereinafter GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION
REQUIREMENTS] (charting state-by-state features of character and fitness
determinations), http://www.ncbex.org/pubs/pdf/2003CompGuide.pdf (last visited Aug. 31,
2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
41. The Board of Law Examiners of the State of North Carolina's "Character and
Fitness Guidelines" provide a typical definition: "The term 'good moral character'
includes but is not limited to the qualities of honesty, fairness, candor, trustworthiness,
observance of fiduciary and personal responsibility and of the laws of North Carolina and
of the United States and a respect for the rights of other persons and things." N.C. BAR
APPLICATION, supra note 3, at 1 (Character and Fitness Guidelines); see Tex. State Bd. of
Law Exam'rs v. Malloy, 793 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Tex. App. 1990) (noting that the good moral
character requirement is intended to exclude applicants who exhibit dishonesty or lack of
trustworthiness).
42. See Stephen K. Huber, Admission to the Practice of Law in Texas: A Critique of
Current Standards and Procedures, 17 HOUS. L. REV. 687, 691-92 (1980) (distinguishing
between "fitness," which concerns "present mental and emotional health of an applicant
as it affects competence to practice law," and "good moral character," which "involves an
evaluation of the character traits of an applicant, particularly honesty and
trustworthiness").
43. GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS, supra note 40, at vii-viii
(articulating the purpose of "moral character and fitness" review and identifying conduct
commonly deemed relevant to "character and fitness" determinations).
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fitness, the choice and placement of questions, and the structure and
headings of the application." This equation of illness with personal
fault only disserves analysis and further stigmatizes bar applicants
diagnosed with depression or other disorders.45  This Article
addresses only fitness and specifically mental fitness. Additionally,
while substance abuse disorders are related to and often accompany
other mental disorders,46 this discussion focuses on mood disorders,
including depression and bipolar disorder.
C. Defining and Measuring Fitness in North Carolina
In North Carolina, "fitness" is contrasted with "impairment."
The bar application defines "impaired" as "[l]imited in your ability to
carry on any life activities to an extent which would, if you had been
an attorney with obligations to a client at the time, have adversely
affected your ability to provide services to that client."47 The ability
to provide services to the client, or "to practice law," is defined to
include: "An accurate perception of reality, the capability to
comprehend facts and circumstances, the capability to reason
logically, the capability to communicate, the capability to recognize
and appropriately resolve ethical dilemmas, honesty, and the
capability to perform legal tasks in a timely manner."48
44. See, e.g., SuP. CT. OF GA., SUPREME COURT RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO
THE PRACTICE OF LAW §§ 1, 5-6, http://www2.state.ga.us/courts/bar/pdf/ruleslO.pdf (last
visited May 10, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); SuP. CT. OF GA.,
POLICY STATEMENT OF THE BOARD TO DETERMINE FITNESS OF BAR APPLICANTS
REGARDING CHARACTER AND FITNESS REVIEWS (treating fitness issues, including those
involving mental illness and substance abuse, as character considerations),
http://www2.state.ga.us/Courtsbar/pages/policy statement.html (last visited May 10, 2003)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
45. In a 1996 survey, nearly four in ten persons viewed major depression as the result
or manifestation of a character flaw. Link et al., supra note 34, at 1330 (reporting that 38.2
percent said a person's "own bad character" was the likely cause of his symptoms of
depression). Roughly two out of three persons thought that alcoholism likely resulted
from the "way the person was raised," and a similar number attributed cocaine addiction
to the person's "own bad character." Id.
46. See supra note 31.
47. N.C. BAR APPLICATION, supra note 3, at 23 (citation omitted).
48. Id. For the most part, this list appropriately points to functions-cognition,
reason, perception, concentration, communication, and the like-that may be impaired by
psychiatric disorders. Honesty is another matter. While disordered thinking or distorted
perceptions might, in fact, compromise a person's ability to make "honest" and accurate
judgments, it would be a mistake to equate such impaired functioning with knowing or
intentional dishonesty, which reflects a person's character, not her illness. A similar
definition from the Rhode Island bar application avoids this mistake:
"Ability to practice law" is to be construed to include the following: (a) The
cognitive capacity to undertake fundamental lawyering skills such as problem
solving, legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, factual investigation,
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The fitness inquiry in North Carolina begins with seven questions
on the bar exam application-questions 26 through 32.'9 With one
exception," all are "have you ever" questions, asking for the
applicant's lifetime history of diagnosis, treatment, and impairment.
For each question, the applicant who answers "yes" must provide
"full details," including the dates of any diagnoses, treatment, or
impairment; the names and addresses of people who told the
applicant he was impaired; and the names and addresses of any
professional, institution, or program that provided treatment to the
applicant or supported his recovery.
organization and management of legal work, making appropriate reasoned legal
judgments, and recognizing and resolving ethical dilemmas, for example; (b) The
ability to communicate legal judgments and legal information to clients, other
attorneys, judicial and regulatory authorities, with or without the use of aids or
devices; and (c) The capability to perform legal tasks in a timely manner.
In re Petition for Admission to R. I. Bar, 683 A.2d 1333, 1337 (R.I. 1996).
49. See N.C. BAR APPLICATION, supra note 3, at 23-25. Those questions ask:
26. Have you within the last seven years been impaired as a result of your use of
alcohol or drugs, or have you been told that you were, or are, impaired as a result
of your use of alcohol or drugs?
27. Have you ever been impaired as a result of any other medical, surgical, or
psychiatric condition, or have you ever been told that you were impaired as a
result of any medical, surgical, or psychiatric condition?
28. Have you ever been diagnosed with or have you been treated for bipolar
disorder, schizophrenia, or any other psychosis or psychotic disorder, or organic
brain syndrome?
29. Have you ever suffered from blackout spell or periods of amnesia or memory
loss?
30. Have you ever been involuntarily committed to any inpatient or outpatient
medical, mental health, or substance abuse facility for treatment or evaluation?
31. Have you ever been admitted at the request of any person other than
yourself, to any inpatient or outpatient mental health or substance abuse facility
for treatment or evaluation?
32. Have you ever been declared legally incompetent or have you or your
property been placed under any guardianship, conservator, or committee; or has
any petition or other proceeding ever been brought requesting that you be
declared legally incompetent, or requesting that your property be placed under
any guardianship, conservator, or committee?
Id.
50. See id. at 23 (question 26).
51. See id. at 23-25. For example, question 27 states:
If your answer is YES, give full details below and on an attached sheet if
necessary, including the names and mailing addresses of the person(s) who told
you you were impaired, to whom the Board can address inquiries if necessary. If
you have been treated by any professional or institution in connection with this
impairment, or have been engaged in any program of recovery, provide the full
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In addition to providing this information, the applicant must sign
a broad "authorization and release" form. It "authorizes and
requests" every identified health care provider to furnish the Board
with all records relevant to the applicant's "general fitness," including
"any and all medical reports ... which may have been made or
prepared pursuant to, or in connection with, any examination or
examinations, consultation or consultations, test or tests, evaluation
or evaluations. 5 2 The applicant also must waive the right to see, be
informed about, or know the contents of any reports or other
information provided in response to any inquiries from the Board. 53
When the Board wants further medical or health care information, it
sends a copy of this release to the applicant's health care provider or
treatment professional, requesting a letter that provides "any
pertinent information you may possess," specifically including "your
analysis of the applicant's condition along with a description of the
treatment afforded and your prognosis in this case."54
A recent study of the Board's character and fitness inquiries
explains the Board's policies and procedures for reviewing
applications. If an applicant answers "yes" to any one of the seven
fitness questions, her application automatically is "red-dotted," or
"flagged for additional scrutiny."56 The Board's executive director
reviews each red-dotted application, "deciding which should be held
name and mailing address of each such professional and institution and program,
and direct each to furnish to the Board any information the Board may request
with respect to any such impairment and treatment.
Id. at 23.
52. Id. (Authorization and Release).
53. See id.
54. Letter from the Bd. of Law Exam'rs of the State of N.C. to Health Care Provider
(Jan. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Letter to Health Care Provider] (requesting information on a
bar exam applicant) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
55. See generally E. D. Gaskins, Jr., A Study of the Character and Fitness
Responsibilities of the North Carolina Board of Law Examiners (2002) (unpublished
report) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The information in this report is
drawn from the Board's published rules, policies, and procedures; from the Board's
written responses to requests for information; from telephone conversations with Board
staff; and from deposition testimony by Fred P. Parker III, Executive Director of the
Board of Law Examiners. Id. The report, which was submitted to the North Carolina Bar
Council on December 31, 2002, concludes with a series of recommendations intended to
increase the consistency, predictability, openness, and fairness of the Board's review
process. See id. at 29-32.
56. Id. at 15. " 'A red dot on a file is simply a flag that the file has some problem[s]
that require a closer look than one that is routine .... It does not 'hurt' an applicant to red
dot his/her file and the rule of thumb should always be 'when in doubt-red dot.' " Id. at
14 (citing Internal Memorandum of the Bd. of Law Exam'rs of the State of N.C. (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review)).
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for further investigation and which should be sent to a special
committee of four Board members for review."57 This committee,
called the Character and Fitness Committee, may either approve an
application or refer it to a Board Panel for a de novo hearing.58 The
Board Panel, made up of two or three members, conducts a formal
hearing.59 Following this hearing, the Board Panel takes one of four
actions: approving the application, denying the application, sending
the application to the full Board for a second hearing, or holding it
pending further information or inquiry.60 An applicant dissatisfied
with the Board Panel's ruling may request a de novo hearing before
the full Board.6" The applicant thereafter may appeal the full Board's
determination to the Wake County Superior Court and ultimately to
the Supreme Court of North Carolina.62
D. The ADA and Mental Health Inquiries by Licensing Boards
Title II of the ADA prohibits state and local public entities from
discriminating against qualified individuals with a disability on the
basis of their disability.63  Threshold issues concerning the
applicability of Title II to licensing boards have been thoughtfully
addressed elsewhere and do not warrant extended discussion here.'
Nonetheless, four basic propositions about ADA litigation warrant
highlighting.
First, professional licensing organizations-including boards of
57. Id. at 14.
58. Id; N.C. RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION, supra note 4, Rule .1203(2). Members
of the Committee cast their votes independently, without conferring with one another.
Gaskins, supra note 55, at 16. The Character and Fitness Committee should not be
confused with the local Bar Candidate Committee before which each applicant must
appear. See N.C. RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION, supra note 4, Rule .0604.
59. N.C. RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION, supra note 4, Rule .1203. The Panel may
require an applicant to appear before it multiple times. N.C. RULES GOVERNING
ADMISSION, supra note 4, Rule .1203. The Panel has the power to subpoena witnesses
and compel the production of documents. N.C. RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION, supra
note 4, Rule .1205.
60. Gaskins, supra note 55, at 16. If the Panel elects to hold the application for
further review, it may allow the applicant to take the bar examination, but seal the results
of the exam until the Panel or the full Board has made a final determination that the
applicant possesses the requisite "good moral character" and "general fitness." N.C.
RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION, supra note 4, Rule .1203(4).
61. N.C. RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION, supra note 4, Rule .1203(2).
62. Id. Rules .1401-.1405.
63. Under Title II, "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000).
64. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 26, at 125-35.
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law examiners, character and fitness committees, and other
organizations that screen and license lawyers-act as arms of the state
judiciary and therefore are "public entities" subject to Title I1.65
Second, the ADA's broad definition of "discrimination"
encompasses more than outright exclusion. It extends to asking
unnecessary and burdensome health- or disability-related questions
and requiring additional related information, even if the answers do
not result in the denial of a benefit or service.66 In the context of
65. Title II, by its terms, applies to "any State or local government" and "any
department, agency ... or other instrumentality of a State ... or local government .... "
§ 12131. Regulations issued by the Department of Justice specify that Title II reaches the
activities of state licensing programs and of the state judiciary. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(6)
(2000) (prohibiting discrimination in the operation of "licensing or certification
programs"); pt. 35, app. A, at 517 ("Title II coverage ... includes activities of the ...
judicial branches of State and local governments."). Bar examiners, who act as agents of
the state courts in licensing lawyers, are therefore covered by Title II. See, e.g., Roe No. 2
v. Ogden, 253 F.3d 1225, 1270 (10th Cir. 2001); Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F.
Supp. 430, 441 (E.D. Va. 1995); Applicants v. Tex. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, No. A 93
CA 740 SS, 1994 WL 923404, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 1994); Ellen S. v. Fla. Bd. of Bar
Exam'rs, 859 F. Supp. 1489, 1495 (S.D. Fla. 1994); In re Petition for Admission to R.I. Bar,
683 A.2d 1333, 1336 (R.I. 1996); Application of Underwood, 1993 WL 649283, at *2 (Me.
Dec. 7, 1993). But cf. In re Frickey, 515 N.W.2d 741, 741 (Minn. 1994) (expressing doubt
about the application of Title II to bar exam questions, but using the court's supervisory
powers to modify the questions nonetheless).
66. Congress did not include a detailed definition of "discrimination" in Title II,
choosing instead to rely on the definitions of discrimination included in Title I, which
applies to employment, and Title III, which applies to public accommodations:
The Committee has chosen not to list all the types of actions that are included
within the term "discrimination," because this title essentially simply extends the
anti-discrimination prohibition ... to all actions of state and local governments.
The Committee intends ... that the forms of discrimination prohibited by [42
U.S.C. § 12132] be identical to those set out in the applicable provisions of titles I
and III of this legislation. Thus, for example, the construction of
"discrimination" set forth in [42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) and (d)] and [42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(b)] should be incorporated into the regulations implementing this title.
HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 84 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,367; see also REP. OF SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND
HUMAN RESOURCES, S. REP. No. 101-116, at 44 (1989) ("The forms of discrimination
prohibited by [42 U.S.C. § 12132] are comparable to those set out in the applicable
provisions of titles I and III of this legislation.").
Title I defines discrimination to include "utilizing standards, criteria, or methods
of administration ... that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability; or...
using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out
or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities
.... 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3), (6). Title III similarly defines discrimination to include:
impos[ing] or apply[ing] ... eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen
out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with disabilities from
fully and equally enjoying any goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
or accommodations, unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the
provision of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations being offered.
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professional licensing, discrimination includes administering a
program "in a manner that subjects qualified individuals with
disabilities to discrimination,"67 including the use of "policies that
unnecessarily impose requirements or burdens on individuals with
disabilities that are not placed on others."68 The additional demands
placed on the bar applicant who answers "yes" to a triggering
question-providing additional information, such as details about
diagnoses and treatment history and the names and addresses of
health care providers; authorizing the release of treatment records;
possibly undergoing further investigations or examinations-are
sufficiently burdensome to constitute discrimination, thus requiring
bar examiners to demonstrate that the questions are necessary to
§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(i).
The United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") looks to Title III to define
"discrimination" in cases challenging bar application inquiries in Title II. See
Memorandum of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15, Ellen S. v. Fla. Bd. of Bar
Exam'rs, 859 F. Supp. 1489 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (No. 94-0429-CIV-KING) ("Unnecessary
inquiries are barred by 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b)(8), which is identical in substance to a
statutory provision in title 1II, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i), and [a] title III regulation, 28
C. F. R. § 36.301(a). The legislative history of the title III statutory provision makes clear
that Congress intended to prohibit unnecessary inquiries into disability." (emphasis
added)), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/foia/flla.txt (last visited on Aug. 31, 2003) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
67. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(6), (8) (2000) (prohibiting public entities from using
"eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability...
from fully and equally enjoying any service, program, or activity, unless such criteria can
be shown to be necessary for the provision of the service, program, or activity being
offered"); id. § 35.130(b)(3)(i) (prohibiting public entities from "subjecting qualified
individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability").
68. Id. app. A, at 488. The DOJ's Technical Assistance Manual for Title II of the
ADA includes this apt illustration of discrimination:
An essential eligibility requirement for obtaining a license to practice medicine is
the ability to practice medicine safely and competently. State Agency X requires
applicants for licenses to practice medicine to disclose whether they have ever
had any physical and mental disabilities. A much more rigorous investigation is
undertaken of applicants answering in the affirmative than of others. This
process violates title II because of the additional burdens placed on individuals
with disabilities, and because the disclosure requirement is not limited to
conditions that currently impair one's ability to practice medicine.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT TITLE II TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL 11-3.5300 (1992), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/
taman2.html.
Additional burdens imposed by mental health inquiries include: the obligation to
provide additional information about diagnoses, treatment, and providers; privacy
invasions resulting from required disclosure of personal information; the required waiver
of confidentiality for records from treatment providers; the obligation to allow the bar
examiners to seek additional information; possibly a mandatory appearance at a hearing;
and deterrence from seeking treatment or being sufficiently candid with a treating
professional, for fear of compelled disclosure of treatment records. Memorandum of the
U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 25-30, Ellen S. (No. 94-0429-CIV-KING).
2196 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
identify unfit applicants. 69 The stigma of being treated as potentially
unfit to practice law only increases the burden."v
Third, the test for justifying burdensome health inquiries is
whether they are necessary to achieve the bar examiners' purpose of
protecting the public from unfit practitioners. In ADA terms, the
questions must be necessary to guard against a "direct threat" to
others.7 ' A direct threat is "a significant risk to the health or safety of
69. See, e.g., Applicants, 1994 WL 923404, at *5 (indicating that although none of the
plaintiffs had been denied a license, the requirement to disclose information that might
subject them to further investigation could constitute discrimination); Ellen S., 859 F.
Supp. at 1494 n.7 (stating that the required consent forms and the examiners' letters of
inquiry to treatment professionals, along with possible investigations and hearings, were
discriminatory burdens on applicants who answered "yes" to a triggering question).
The only question is whether "merely" asking a status-based question, without
requiring the applicant to give details, identify care providers, or release treatment
records, is in itself discrimination. One court concluded that it was not the initial questions
alone, but the demands for additional information or investigations that constituted
discrimination. Med. Soc'y of N.J. v. Jacobs, No. 93-3670 (WGB), 1993 WL 413016, at *8
(D.N.J. Oct. 5, 1993). But as this court itself suggested, the distinction may be more
theoretical than real. See id. (noting that the medical licensing board "theoretically" could
"ask questions concerning the status of applicants" without investigating or acting upon
the answers, but noting that this was not the case).
70. The DOJ has recognized that questions about a person's mental health history or
status are burdensome because they are stigmatizing. Memorandum of the U.S. as
Amicus Curiae at 29, Ellen S. (No. 94-0429-CIV-KING). The DOJ also has cited the
individual's "substantial liberty interest ... in avoiding the social stigma of being known to
have been treated for a mental illness." Id. For judicial recognition of stigma as a form of
discrimination under Title II, see Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 600-01 (1999) (finding
unjustified institutional isolation of people with mental disorders discriminatory in part
because it "perpetuates unwarranted assumptions" about people with disabilities and
imposes a "stigmatizing injury"); Doe v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n for the Fifteenth
Judicial Circuit of Fla., 906 F. Supp. 1534, 1542 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (accepting the contention
that requiring disclosure of mental health information in a public document would
"subject plaintiff to additional impermissible burdens" in light of the " 'overarching
purpose of the ADA: to eliminate the stigma and stereotypes associated with disability
and to eradicate discrimination on the basis of such stereotypes' " (quoting Carol J. Banta,
Note, The Impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act on State Bar Examiners' Inquiries
into the Psychological History of Bar Applicants, 94 MICH. L. REV. 167,177 (1995))).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (2000) ("Nothing in this subchapter shall require an entity
to permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages and accommodations of such entity where such individual poses a
direct threat to the health or safety of others." (emphasis added)). Courts analyzing ADA
challenges to bar application inquiries routinely invoke this direct threat test, sometimes
calling it the "necessity test" or "necessity exception." See, e.g., Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar
Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 446 (E.D. Va. 1995) (recognizing that "certain severe mental or
emotional disorders may pose a direct threat to public safety," but concluding that the
board had not demonstrated the necessity of the challenged mental health questions);
Doe, 906 F. Supp. at 1540 (stating that under the necessity exception, public entities may
use eligibility criteria that burden individuals with disabilities if the criteria are "necessary
to insure the safe operation of the program or if the individual 'poses a direct threat to the
health or safety of others' " (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 455 (1995))); Applicants,
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others that cannot be eliminated" by reasonable modifications.72
Thus, a mental health inquiry must be limited to information relevant
to whether an applicant presents a "significant risk" of harm to
prospective clients, not merely a remote, theoretical, or potential
risk.73
The fourth proposition relates to the challenge of finding a bar
applicant who is both willing to bear the risks and costs of suing the
gatekeeper to his chosen profession and qualified to sue under the
ADA. Most eligible bar applicants, having successfully completed
law school, have considerable cognitive and communicative skills and
can handle an intellectually, physically, and emotionally demanding
workload. Under recent Supreme Court precedent, such applicants
might have difficulty satisfying the ADA's definition of disabled, even
if they have a major mental disorder and even if that disorder causes
them considerable distress or makes them struggle to meet the
demands of law school or other aspects of their lives.74 Thus many
applicants who are burdened, stigmatized, or deterred from treatment
by unnecessary mental health inquiries will not be able to seek
redress under the ADA. There are, however, other prospective
ADA plaintiffs.75 Regardless, the final proposition is this: the fact
1994 WL 923404, at *6 (recognizing that "[w]hen, as in this case, questions of public safety
are involved, the determination of whether an applicant meets 'essential eligibility
requirements' involves consideration of whether the individual with a disability poses a
direct threat to the health and safety of others." (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 448
(1993))).
72. § 12182(b)(3).
73. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998) ("Because few, if any, activities in
life are risk free, Arline and the ADA do not ask whether a risk exists, but whether it is
significant." (citing Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 & n. 16
(1987))). For a more complete discussion of the ADA's direct threat defense, see
generally Ann Hubbard, Interpreting and Implementing the ADA's Direct Threat Defense,
95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1279 (2001) (assessing the proper understanding and application of the
direct threat defense).
74. The ADA defines "disability" as a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of an individual's "major life activities." § 12102(2)(A).
A person with a serious or even life-threatening disease might manage through medical
supports or personal strength to function reasonably well at work and in other aspects of
his life. If so, he is not disabled as that term has been interpreted by the Supreme Court.
See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (holding that the existence of
a disability, or a substantial limitation on a major life activity, must be based on an
individual's actual functioning, in light of mitigating measures such as medicine or assistive
devices, and not on the severity of the underlying disease or condition).
75. In addition to protecting individuals who are actually disabled, the ADA protects
persons who have a record or history of a disability or who are regarded as having a
disability, whether or not they do. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(2). These definitions would
encompass applicants who presently are high-functioning in all important respects, but
who in the past were seriously debilitated by a mental disorder, as well as applicants who
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that many applicants who are injured by an illegal practice cannot or
will not sue is no justification for continuing that practice.
In sum, Title II does not prohibit a licensing agency like a board
of law examiners from defining its own "essential eligibility criteria"
for admission, including qualifications like "good moral character"
and "general fitness" to practice law.76 Indeed, courts show great
respect for the bar examiners' obligation to try to identify applicants
whose lack of fitness poses a threat to the public." The bar
examiners' authority is limited, however, by the prohibition on using
disability-related criteria that exclude or discriminate against
individuals with disabilities unless the examiners can demonstrate that
those criteria are necessary. Therefore, the focus of the Title II
analysis is which-if any-inquiries about mental health status are
necessary to screen for unfit lawyers.
II. THE GROWING CONSENSUS FOR NARROWING THE QUESTIONS
A. Post-ADA Litigation and Reform
Over the last decade, the legal understanding of what constitutes
necessity in this context has developed hand-in-hand with a growing
professional recognition that broad diagnosis and treatment questions
are ill-suited to assess an applicant's present capacity to function as a
competent and reliable lawyer. Mental health inquiries are a
are perceived as having significant dysfunction in one or more life activities, whether or
not they do. See, e.g., Bowen v. Income-Producing Mgmt., 202 F.3d 1282, 1287 (10th Cir.
2000) (applying this standard to the activities of working and learning).
76. Hawkins v. Moss, 503 F.2d 1171, 1175 (4th Cir. 1974) (acknowledging that the
"power of the courts of each state to establish their own rules of qualification for the
practice of law within their jurisdiction, subject only to the requirements of the due
process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, is beyond
controversy").
77. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 41 n.4 (1961) (recognizing that
most states require good moral character, with the applicant bearing the burden of
demonstrating good character); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 239
(1957) (recognizing the right of states to set high standards of qualification and, to this
end, to investigate an applicant's character and fitness to practice law); Applicants v. Tex.
State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, No. A 93 CA 740 SS, 1994 WL 923404, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Oct.
11, 1994) (noting the need for a "rigorous application procedure" to "ensure that Texas'
lawyers are capable, morally and mentally, to provide ... important services"); In re
Willis, 288 N.C. 1, 14, 215 S.E.2d 771, 779 (1975) (recognizing the Board's right to "require
high standards for admission to the bar, including good moral character and proficiency in
its laws, so long as the qualifying standards have a rational connection with the applicant's
fitness or capacity to practice law" (citing Schware, 353 U.S. at 239)); see also Keenan v.
Bd. of Law Exam'rs of State of N.C., 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1359 (E.D.N.C. 1970) ("In
licensing attorneys there is but one constitutionally permissible state objective: the
assurance that the applicant is capable and fit to practice law.").
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relatively recent feature of the bar admissions process. In the mid-
1970s, most states asked no questions directly addressing the
applicant's mental health. 78 From the outset, skeptics have wondered
whether mental health questions effectively identify applicants who
pose a risk to the public or instead simply invade applicants' privacy,
fuel prejudice about mental disorders, and deter prospective
applicants from seeking needed treatment.79 Skepticism turned to
litigation following the passage of the ADA, which provided new
legal norms to address these questions. Successful challenges in
several states lead to two broad conclusions, one legal and one policy-
related. First, to satisfy the ADA's necessity requirement, questions
about mental health status must be narrowly tailored to address only
current or recent impairment, diagnoses, and treatment that are
relevant to the applicant's present fitness to practice law. Second,
even mental health questions that are legal may nonetheless be
unwise. Questions about an applicant's conduct more effectively
identify serious impairment and dysfunction, without deterring law
students and other applicants from seeking the counseling or other
services that will help them learn to handle the stresses they will
encounter in their legal careers.
Three early rulings, while not decisions on the merits, provided
the foundation for subsequent Title II challenges to mental health
questions in connection with professional licensing. In each, the court
concluded that "have you ever" questions about mental disorders,
which required additional information from applicants who answered
"yes," violated Title II by imposing additional and unwarranted
burdens on qualified individuals with disabilities. In Medical Society
of New Jersey v. Jacobs," the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey, ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction, found
that the plaintiff demonstrated a high probability of success on the
merits in its challenges to the medical board's "have you ever"
questions. The court found that questions about the existence of or
treatment for alcohol or drug dependence or any mental or
psychiatric condition over the course of the applicant's lifetime,
combined with the further investigation triggered by a "yes" answer,
discriminated against qualified applicants with disabilities by
imposing additional and unnecessary burdens on them.8" The
78. Michael J. Place & Susan L. Bloom, Mental Fitness Requirements for the Practice
of Law, 23 BUFF. L. REV. 579, 582 (1974); Rhode, supra note 5, at 595-96.
79. See, e.g., Place & Bloom, supra note 78, at 586; Rhode, supra note 5, at 581-83.
80. No. 93-3670 (WGB), 1993 WL 413016 (D.N.J. Oct 5, 1993).
81. Id. at *8.
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Supreme Judicial Court of Maine employed similar reasoning in In re
Applications of Underwood & Piano,82 a challenge to the bar
examiners' refusal to admit two applicants who refused to respond to
mental health inquiries.83 The court concluded that asking applicants
if they had ever been diagnosed with an "emotional, nervous or
mental disorder" or if they had been treated for such a disorder in the
preceding decade and requiring them to authorize the release of all
medical records related to their diagnosis and treatment for those
disorders violated the ADA." Finally, in Ellen S. v. Florida Board of
Bar Examiners,5 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida ruled that the plaintiffs stated a claim that the Florida bar
examiners' mental health inquiries violated Title II of the ADA by
placing additional burdens on qualified applicants with disabilities.86
The challenged inquiries included "have you ever" questions about
diagnosis, treatment, or medication for a "nervous, mental, or
emotional condition"; a consent form requiring applicants to
authorize the release of any and all mental health records; a letter of
inquiry sent to past treatment professionals; and the Board's follow-
up investigations and hearings.87
These "have you ever" questions were seen as "easy targets" for
ADA challenges.88 Courts also have invalidated more circumscribed
questions limited to the applicant's mental health treatment during
the five or ten years preceding the application. In Clark v. Virginia
Board of Bar Examiners,89 for example, the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia struck a question about treatment or
counseling for any "mental, emotional or nervous disorders" during
82. 1993 WL 649283 (Me. Dec. 7, 1993).
83. Id. at *1.
84. Id. at *2 n.1. The challenged question asked:
Within the ten (10) year period prior to the date of this application, have you
ever received treatment of emotional, nervous or mental disorder? ... If so, state
the names and complete addresses of each psychologist, psychiatrist or other
health care professional, including social worker, who treated you. (THIS
QUESTION DOES NOT INTEND TO APPLY TO OCCASIONAL
CONSULTATION FOR CONDITIONS OF EMOTIONAL STRESS OR
DEPRESSION, AND SUCH CONSULTATION SHOULD NOT BE
REPORTED.).
Id. at *2.
85. 859 F. Supp. 1489 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
86. Id. at 1493-94 ("[A]s the Title II regulations make clear, [the challenged question]
and the subsequent inquiries discriminate against Plaintiffs by subjecting them to
additional burdens based on their disability.").
87. Id. at 1491 n.1.
88. See Herr, supra note 4, at 647-49.
89. 880 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1995).
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the preceding five years.90 The court recognized that the ADA
permits a licensing agency to ask even burdensome questions if it can
demonstrate that the questions are "necessary to the performance of
its licensing function."'" Because the function of the Virginia Board
of Bar Examiners was to protect the public, it could justify the
challenged question only by showing that the question was both
effective and necessary to protect the public from a direct threat.
9 2
This standard is sometimes referred to as the "necessity exception." 93
The Clark court found, however, that asking about prior mental
health counseling was not effective, much less necessary, given that
the board could not "point to a single instance where an affirmative
answer to [the counseling question] ha[d] prevented licensure." 94 The
court further observed that the counseling question risked being
counterproductive because it deterred applicants from seeking or
receiving treatment that would help control a potentially impairing
condition. 5 Although the court refrained from deciding or suggesting
90. Id. at 431. The challenged question asked:
Have you within the past five (5) years, been treated or counseled for a mental,
emotional or nervous disorders [sic]?" Id. at 433. If the applicant answered
"yes," she was instructed to provide: "(a) Dates of treatment or counseling; (b)
Name, address and telephone number of attending physician or counselor or
other health care provider; (c) Name, address and telephone number of hospital
or institution; (d) Describe completely the diagnosis and treatment and the
prognosis and provide any other relevant facts. You may attach letters from
your treating health professionals if you believe this would be helpful.
Id.
91. Id. at 442-43.
92. See id. at 443-45; accord Applicants v. Tex. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, No. A 93
CA 740 SS, 1994 WL 923404, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 1994) ("[w]hen, as in this case,
questions of public safety are involved, the determination of whether an applicant meets
'essential eligibility requirements' involves consideration of whether the individual with a
disability poses a direct threat to the health and safety of others" (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 35,
app. A, at 448 (1993))).
93. See, e.g., Doe v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of
Fla., 906 F. Supp. 1534, 1540 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (stating that under the "necessity exception,"
public entities may use eligibility criteria that burden individuals with disabilities if the
criteria are "necessary to insure the safe operation of the program or if the individual
'poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others' " (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A,
at 455 (1995))).
94. Clark, 880 F.Supp. at 437. The Board official who screened the applications
testified that, in his twenty-three years of experience, he had "never brought to the
attention of the Board an application disclosing the mere receipt of treatment or
counseling for stress, depression, or marital or adjustment problems. Further, no applicant
ha[d] been denied the right to sit for the bar examination based on their answer to [the
counseling question]." Id. at 434.
95. Id. at 437-38. The court cited evidence, including testimony from several law
school deans, that questions related to mental health counseling deterred students from
seeking treatment. Id. Moreover, the court recognized the danger that such questions
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which mental health inquiries (if any) would be permissible,96 it did
note that both parties' experts "testified that past behavior is the best
predictor of present and future mental fitness."97
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island had similar concerns about
irrelevant or even counterproductive questions on its state's bar
application. In In re Petition & Questionnaire for Admission to the
Rhode Island Bar,98 the court invalidated three questions. One asked
about lifetime history of hospitalization for any emotional, nervous,
or mental disorder.99  The other two asked about chemical
dependence or diagnosis or treatment of emotional, nervous, or
mental disorders."° The latter questions had two limitations: first,
the inquiries were limited to the preceding five years; and second,
they addressed only conditions or disorders that, by the applicant's
self-assessment, would impair her ability to practice law.10' The court
found that even these inquiries into past treatment or diagnosis had
little, if any, value in predicting an applicant's future functioning.02
At the same time, the court found that the prospect of having to
disclose diagnosis and treatment information could deter applicants
from seeking needed treatment. 03 The court held that questions
about diagnosis or treatment history violate the ADA unless the bar
examiners demonstrate a direct threat to public safety if persons with
a mental or emotional disorder or history of substance-abuse
treatment are admitted to the bar."
could inhibit effective treatment: "Faced with the knowledge that one's treating physician
may be required to disclose diagnosis and treatment information, an applicant may be less
than totally candid with their therapist." Id. at 438. "Thus," concluded the court, "it is
possible that open-ended mental health inquiries may prevent the very treatment which, if
given, would help control the applicant's condition and make the practice of law possible."
Id.
96. Id. at 446; see also id. at 436 n.10 (finding it unnecessary to decide whether mental
health questions should be eliminated entirely).
97. Id.at 446; see also id. at 435 (quoting expert testimony about the limited predictive
value of past treatment evidence and identifying "past behavior" as "the best indicator of
an applicant's present ability to function and work").
98. 683 A.2d 1333 (R.I. 1996).
99. Id. at 1334.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1337.
103. Id. at 1336.
104. Id.; accord Doe v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit
of Fla., 906 F. Supp. 1534, 1540 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (holding that "public entities may utilize
eligibility criteria that screen out, or tend to screen out, individuals with disabilities [only]
if the criteria are necessary to insure the safe operation of the program or if the individual
'poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others' " (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A,
at 455 (1995))).
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In Doe v. Judicial Nominating 'Commission for the Fifteenth
Judicial Circuit of Florida,"°5 a federal district court in Florida
similarly held that, under the "necessity exception," public entities
may use eligibility criteria that burden individuals with disabilities
only if the criteria are "necessary to insure the safe operation of the
program or if the individual 'poses a direct threat to the health or
safety of others.' "106 Doe makes clear that a question may be
overinclusive-and therefore unduly burdensome-either because its
time frame is too long, requiring the disclosure of remote conditions
or treatment, or because its scope is too broad, requiring the
disclosure of recent conditions or treatment that are not relevant to
an applicant's professional fitness."7 The court enjoined the judicial
nominating committee from asking whether an applicant has had
"any form of emotional disorder or disturbance"'0 8 or been treated by
"any mental health care professionals,' '19 even if the inquiry is limited
to the preceding five years.110 This question is objectionable because
it could "force the disclosure of intimate, personal matters that have
nothing to do with job performance,""'1 including family counseling or
"treatment resulting from personal traumas such as childhood sexual
abuse or loss of a loved one."" 2 The court emphasized that "forced
disclosure" and the resulting stigmatization are themselves burdens
The issue was before the Supreme Court of Rhode Island on petition from the
state bar Committee on Character and Fitness, with a recommendation from a special
master. In re Petition, 683 A.2d at 1333. The court, acting under its general supervisory
powers, directed that the bar application include two questions, each restricted to current
conditions that would, in the applicant's view, impair her ability to practice law. Id. at
1337. For another example of a court's use of its supervisory powers to modify bar
application questions, see In re Frickey, 515 N.W.2d 741, 741 (Minn. 1994). The deans and
various faculty members of three Minnesota law schools petitioned the Minnesota
Supreme Court to eliminate questions about mental health treatment on the grounds that
they violated state and federal law, including the ADA; deterred law students from
seeking mental health counseling; invaded applicants' privacy; and had a disparate impact
on female applicants, who were more likely to have sought treatment. Id. The court
ordered the bar examiners to remove the questions. Id.
105. 906 F. Supp. 1534 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
106. Id. at 1540 (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 455). The court also stated that
"[t]he exception must be read narrowly to further the remedial purpose of the statute."
Id. at 1545.
107. Id. at 1542-45.
108. Id. at 1537.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1545. The court enjoined the use of several other questions. These included
"have you ever" questions about the existence of or treatment for any mental illness or
chemical dependency, and questions about health status and the existence of any sensory
impairments or "other debilitating handicap or disease." Id. at 1537.
111. Id. at 1544.
112. Id. at 1545.
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prohibited by the ADA unless the inquiry is justified or required by
the necessity exception. 3
Not every court has approached mental health inquiries with this
degree of skepticism. The notable exception is Applicants v. Texas
State Board of Law Examiners ("Texas Applicants")."4 In Texas
Applicants, the court addressed a challenge to two questions about
"serious mental illnesses,""' 5  namely, "bipolar disorder,
schizophrenia, paranoia, and ... other psychotic disorder[s].""' 6 The
application asked whether would-be lawyers had been diagnosed with
or treated for any of these disorders in the preceding ten years and
whether they had been hospitalized for treatment of any of these
disorders in the preceding ten years or since turning eighteen,
whichever was shorter."7  An applicant who answered "yes" was
required to provide details and to sign an authorization and release of
medical records." 8  The Texas court articulated the familiar
"necessity" or "direct threat" test,'' 9 stating that, because public
safety was involved, the proper consideration was "whether the
individual with a disability poses a direct threat to the health and
safety of others."' 120
At the end of the day, however, the court required scant
justification for these diagnosis and treatment questions. Evidence
showed that in the preceding seven years the board's character and
fitness director had reviewed only about thirty files as a result of
affirmative answers to these and even broader questions about
mental health treatment.'' He had to reach back eight years to find a
113. Id. at 1544. The harm was particularly great in this case, as the requested
information provided by judicial candidates would be available to the public. Id. The
court's reasoning, however, would disallow the forced disclosure of any disability-related
information that is not related to job performance and required to protect the public. Id.
at 1545.
114. No. A 93 CA 740 SS, 1994 WL 923404 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 1994).
115. Id. at *3.
116. Id. at *1.
117. Id. at *2 n.5.
118. Id. The details included dates, diagnoses, a description of her present conditions,
and the names and addresses of all treating professionals. The authorization was limited
to the release of medical records related to the specified diagnoses. Id.
119. Id. at *7.
120. Id. at *6 (citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 448 (1993)).
121. Id. at *3 n.8. From 1986 until April 1992, applicants were required to report
whether they had been either "examined or treated" for "any mental, emotional or
nervous conditions," not merely for the specified serious disorders. Id. at *2 n.3 (emphasis
added). From April 1992 until July 1993, applicants were asked about "treat[ment] for
any mental illness" in the preceding ten years. Id. at *2 n.4. The challenged version of the
question had been in effect for about one year at the time of trial. Thus, even the modest
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single applicant who was denied admission largely for mental health
reasons and who would not have been identified by other questions. 122
Nonetheless, the court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the
question served no useful purpose.2 1 Entirely missing from the
court's discussion was any consideration of whether the deterrent
effect of asking the question would ultimately produce greater lawyer
impairment by causing more law students, and ultimately perhaps
more lawyers, to avoid treatment.
In a similar vein, a federal district court in Virginia suggested
that it would uphold questions adopted by the Virginia Board of Bar
Examiners in response to Clark. In O'Brien v. Virginia Board of Bar
Examiners,24 the plaintiff refused to answer the revised questions and
sought a preliminary injunction requiring the board to allow him to
take the bar exam . 2  The revised questions asked whether, within the
preceding five years, the applicant had been diagnosed or treated for
certain identified disorders or for "any other condition [that]
significantly impaired [his] behavior, judgment, understanding,
capacity to recognize reality, or ability to function in school, work or
response rate of nearly nine affirmative answers a year is higher than would be expected
under the narrower question.
122. Id. at *4 n.10. Other applicants may have abandoned their hopes of becoming
lawyers rather than submit to the investigations. See id. at *5 nn.11-12 (noting two files
that were terminated for the applicants' failure to sign the release or undergo a board-
required evaluation, and two cases in which hearings were set but never held). During the
same period, the board denied admission to applicant Charles Malloy for lack of "good
moral character" largely because he answered, but criticized, a question about mental
health treatment. Tex. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs v. Malloy, 793 S.W.2d 753, 754 (Tex.
App. 1990). The board relied on his answers to three questions. Two concerned conduct.
First, he stated that he had never understood why he was fired from one job. Id. at 756.
Second, he reported (although not required to) misdemeanor charges of disorderly
conduct (of which he was found not guilty) and failure to identify (which was later
dismissed). Id. at 758. But the bar examiners cited his answer to a mental health
treatment question as "perhaps the best evidence that Malloy lacked the required
character to practice law in Texas." Id. at 759. In response to the question whether he
had been "examined or treated for mental, emotional, or nervous disorders" in the
preceding ten years, he answered, "Yes, I saw a counselor as a youth (17-18 yrs. old). This
stuff is really none of your business as it does not affect my ability to practice law in
Texas." Id. at 757. Malloy's therapist informed the board that the counseling was to help
Malloy cope with family problems following the death of Malloy's younger brother. Id. at
759. The board nonetheless concluded that this answer, along with the others, indicated a
lack of good moral character, which was relevant to his current fitness or capacity to
practice law. Id. at 755. Malloy appealed. Id. at 754. The district court reversed, finding
that the board's decision was not based on substantial evidence, and the Texas Court of
Appeals affirmed. Id. at 760.
123. Applicants, 1994 WL 923404, at *7.
124. No. 98-0009-A, 1998 WL 391019 (E.D. Va. Jan. 23, 1998).
125. Id. at *1.
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other important life activities. ' 26 The application made clear that the
board did not seek, and the applicant need not provide, any
information about "situational counseling such as stress counseling,
domestic counseling, grief counseling, and counseling for eating or
sleeping disorders. ' 127 Judge Cacheris, who decided Clark, declined
to grant the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding
that he had not shown "a great likelihood of success on the merits.'
' 28
While Texas Applicants and O'Brien represent a more lenient
view, 12 it is significant that both cases upheld inquiries that were
limited in two distinct ways that earlier cases deemed important.
First, they were limited in time, covering only the preceding five or
ten years. 30 Second, they were limited in scope, asking only about
more "serious" disorders, as identified either by diagnoses or by
degree of impairment. 3' The questionnaires disavowed any interest
in the disclosure of "situational" counseling and excluded information
about treatment for conditions (such as moderate or well-controlled
depression) that do not produce significant impairment and
information about most treatment sought before the age of
eighteen. 3 2  Thus, neither decision provides support for lifetime
inquiries into even serious diagnoses or for any inquiries into mere
counseling.
B. The Professional Consensus
The passage of the ADA prompted organizations of lawyers, law
professors, and law examiners to revisit existing bar application
questions to determine whether they imposed additional and
unnecessary burdens on persons with disabilities. As a result of this
126. Id. at *3.
127. Id.
128. Id. In addition, the court found the revised authorization and release to be
"carefully tailored to respect the [applicant's] privacy rights" because it allowed the Board
access "only to information relevant to the applicant's fitness to practice law." Id. at *4.
129. Professor Jon Bauer identifies two basic standards for analyzing the "necessity" of
mental health questions on bar applications. Under the "strict scrutiny" standard
articulated in Jacobs, virtually all disability-based questions on applications violate Title
II. Med. Soc'y of N.J. v. Jacobs, No. 93-3670 (WGB), 1993 WL 413016, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct.
5, 1993); Bauer, supra note 26, at 139-43. Under the "relaxed scrutiny" standard of Texas
Applicants, courts are more deferential to bar examiners' fitness determinations. Bauer,
supra note 26,. at 143-48. The only criterion is that they be "narrowly framed." Bauer,
supra note 26, at 143.
130. O'Brien, 1998 WL 391019, at *3; Applicants v. Tex. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, No.
A 93 CA 740 SS, 1994 WL 923404, at *2 n.5 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 1994).
131. O'Brien, 1998 WL 391019, at *3; Applicants, 1994 WL 923404, at *3.
132. O'Brien, 1998 WL 391019, at *4; Applicants, 1994 WL 923404, at *7 n.14.
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reexamination, the American Bar Association ("ABA") adopted a
resolution calling for narrower mental health questions on bar
applications, and the NCBE narrowed the mental health questions on
its standard application and character form.133 These developments
brought bar application questions closer in line with the American
Psychiatric Association's ("APA") guidelines for mental health
screening for medical professionals.134
The ABA resolution resulted from the collaboration of four
organizations: the ABA Commission on Mental and Physical
Disability Law, the ABA Section on Legal Education and Admissions
to the Bar, the NCBE, and the Association of American Law Schools
("AALS").135 These organizations, whose members had differing and
often conflicting perspectives on both the effectiveness and the
propriety of mental fitness inquiries, came together to seek consensus
on appropriate fitness inquiries. 36 These inquiries would need to
provide the bar examiners the information necessary to assess an
applicant's current fitness, respect the applicants' privacy interests,
and further the shared interest in not unduly deterring law students
and other applicants from seeking counseling and other helpful
treatment. With these goals in mind, the four organizations produced
a joint resolution calling for "narrow limits" on mental health
inquiries to bar applicants.'37 The ABA House of Delegates adopted
this resolution in 1994.138
The ABA resolution recommends three principles to guide bar
examiners in formulating character and fitness inquiries. First, bar
examiners should "consider the privacy concerns of bar admission
133. ABA Resolution, supra note 11, at 598. See generally NCBE CHARACTER AND
FITNESS REPORT, supra note 17 (reflecting narrower character and fitness questions).
134. See APA GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 1.
135. ABA Resolution, supra note 11, at 598.
136. Id.
137. Id. The ABA Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law and the Section
on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar released statements accompanying the
resolution, emphasizing that it was a "compromise position." Id. at 597. Members of both
organizations would have preferred to take the position that any inquiries into mental
health diagnoses and treatment were inappropriate. Id. at 597-98; see Coleman &
Shellow, supra note 21, at 162 n.90 (noting that the Commission proposed that inquiries be
limited to " 'specific behaviors related to character and fitness, such as the individual's
conduct, exercise of responsibility, trustworthiness, integrity and reliability' " or the
existence of a current "condition that significantly impairs that applicant's ability to
exercise the responsibilities of an attorney such as handling funds, exercising independent
judgment, meeting deadlines, or otherwise affecting the representation of clients" (quoting
ABA Resolution, supra note 11, at 598)).
138. ABA Resolution, supra note 11, at 597.
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applicants."'39  Second, they should "tailor questions concerning
mental health and treatment narrowly in order to elicit information
about current fitness to practice law."14  And finally, they should
"take steps to ensure that their processes do not discourage those
who would benefit from seeking professional assistance with personal
problems and issues of mental health from doing so.' 141 Reflecting
these principles, the ABA further recommended "[t]hat fitness
determinations may include specific, targeted questions about an
applicant's behavior, conduct or any current impairment of the
applicant's ability to practice law."'42 The ABA thus encouraged bar
examiners to shift their inquiries from treatment history or diagnoses
to an applicant's past conduct and current functioning.
At the time the NCBE endorsed this resolution, its own
character questionnaire included far-reaching questions that were not
in keeping with the call for narrowly tailored questions focusing on
current functioning. 143 In response, the NCBE modified its form by
narrowing its inquiries, though perhaps not as tightly as the ABA
resolution would seem to require. "44  Because many states pattern
139. Id. at 598.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. (emphases added).
143. See Herr, supra note 4, at 644-45. The NCBE form then in use asked whether the
applicant had "ever been treated or counseled for any mental, emotional, or nervous
disorder or condition" or had "ever voluntarily entered or been involuntarily admitted to
an institution for treatment of a mental, emotional, or nervous disorder or condition." Id.
(citing Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 441 (E.D. Va. 1995)).
144. See NCBE CHARACTER REPORT, supra note 17, at 12. Question 25 asks:
"Within the past five years have you been diagnosed with or have you been treated for
bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, paranoia, or any other psychotic disorder?" Id. While this
inquiry is time-limited and focused on more serious disorders, it asks about diagnosis and
treatment history, not current functioning. Question 26 inquires: "Do you currently have
any condition or impairment (including, but not limited to, substance abuse, alcohol abuse,
or a mental, emotional, or nervous disorder or condition) which in any way currently
affects, or if untreated could affect, your ability to practice law in a competent and
professional manner?" Id. This otherwise well-crafted question requires an applicant to
disclose a controlled or treated condition that has no actual effect on current functioning.
Around this time, the federal government revised its own security clearance
inquiries, tailoring questions about mental disorders to relate to the employee's job
performance and eliminating the requirement that the employee sign general releases to
allow examination of all medical records. Herr, supra note 4, at 643. Professor Herr
suggests that the reforms of the bar questionnaires and of the government security
clearance questionnaires were "not unrelated." Id. Both reflected a commitment to
conform to the ADA, as well as a growing concern about the perils of professional
penalties for seeking mental health treatment. Herr points to the suicide of White House
aide Vincent Foster as a salient reminder of this risk. Id. at 644. It was later learned that
Foster, despite his depression, had hesitated to see a psychiatrist for fear that it would cost
him his White House security clearance. Id. (citing Lloyd Cutler, Psychotherapy: No Sign
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their own fitness inquiries after the NCBE's form, or contract with
the NCBE to administer their fitness reviews, these revisions were
significant.
These steps toward narrowing or eliminating questions about
mental health diagnoses and treatment bring the legal profession
more in line with the medical profession. The APA's guidelines for
licensing boards-principally medical or nursing boards-call for a
focus on current functioning or impairment, not on diagnosis or
treatment history.14 5 When a licensing board assesses an applicant's
fitness, "[t]he salient concern is always the individual's current
capacity to function and/or current functional impairment."'46 Thus,
applications should inquire only about "disorders that currently
impair the capacity to function" and that are "relevant to present
practice." '47 A sample question for assessing current functioning asks
only about recent disorders that actually impair the individual's
ability to practice.148
Significantly, the APA asserts that "[p]rior psychiatric treatment
is, per se, not relevant to the question of current impairment.'
1 49
Accordingly, it is "not appropriate or informative to ask about past
psychiatric treatment except in the context of understanding current
functioning.""15 Where there is no evidence that current functioning
is impaired, there is no reason to inquire about past mental health
treatment. Indeed, the APA expresses concern about "policies that
require inappropriate and indiscriminant disclosure of a history of
psychiatric consultation and treatment .... [that] stigmatize
individuals who seek consultation and treatment" and "inhibit
individuals who are in need of treatment from seeking help. '151
of a Security Risk, WASH. POST, July 12, 1994, at A17).
145. See APA GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 1. The APA is "a national medical
specialty society," whose "physician members specialize in the diagnosis and treatment of
mental and emotional illnesses and substance use disorders." Id. While these guidelines
are addressed to medical licensing boards and others who assess physician impairment,
they are equally applicable to assessing attorney impairment.
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. Id. (emphases added).
148. Id. ("In the last two years have you had any medical condition, mental disorder,
or use of alcohol or drugs which has impaired your ability to practice medicine or to
function as a student of medicine?").
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. By the mid-1990s, most, but not all, state medical licensing boards had
adopted the APA's recommended approach, asking about impaired professional
performance rather than diagnosis or treatment. Claudia Center, et al., Confronting
Depression and Suicide in Physicians: A Consensus Statement, 289 J. AM. MED. ASS'N
3161, 3164 (June 18, 2003). In a recent statement, a respected team of medical, legal, and
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The federal courts and medical and legal professional
organizations thus concur that a licensing board's proper concern is
the applicant's current fitness, not her history of impairment or
treatment. There also is a legal and professional consensus that
mental health questions must be narrowly tailored to seek only
information relevant to an applicant's current professional fitness.
Finally, there is widespread concern that questions about diagnosis
and treatment will deter applicants from seeking needed care to
maintain their mental and emotional fitness. These widely accepted
principles provide one basis for evaluating the mental health
questions on the North Carolina bar application.
III. REFORMING THE FITNESS INQUIRY IN NORTH CAROLINA
The preceding discussion helps identify two major flaws in North
Carolina's bar exam application. First, the "have you ever" questions
often require disclosure of information too remote in time to be
relevant to an applicant's current fitness to practice law. An
applicant's hospitalization at age fifteen for major depression has no
bearing, a decade or more later, on her current fitness to practice law.
Second, the questions require disclosure of diagnoses and treatment
that have no relation to an applicant's fitness to practice law,
regardless of their timing. A third-year law student's decision to seek
counseling to help her through a painful divorce in no way suggests
that she poses a threat to prospective clients. Because such
information is neither relevant nor necessary to determining an
applicant's fitness, the ADA prohibits seeking it. The issue for the
Board and the Bar is not whether the current questions are valid, but
how they should be revised.
Truth be told, even stubborn-spirited revisions to bring about
mere grudging compliance with the ADA would constitute a step
forward for North Carolina. But candid recognition that North
Carolina's current bar application questions do not comply with the
ADA presents an opportunity for something worthier-a voluntary,
cooperative effort to realize truly progressive reform that will bear
witness to the Bar's dedication to equal opportunity, fair treatment,
and respect for all. As members of the North Carolina legal
community, we should settle for nothing less than an open-minded,
professional licensing experts cited remaining diagnosis and treatment questions as
"punitive barriers" to physicians' seeking mental health treatment. The team called on
licensing boards to "require disclosure of misconduct, malpractice, or impaired
professional abilities" rather than diagnosis or treatment and to limit the time frame of
impairment questions. Id. at 3161, 3165.
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inclusive, and ambitious pursuit to identify the fitness review that best
serves the long-term interests of the public and the profession. The
fitness review should reflect the Bar's high standards of conduct and
professionalism; its continued commitment to confidential support,
treatment, and intervention for impaired lawyers; and its respect for
the letter and the spirit of the law.
To seize this opportunity and effect needed change, we should be
mindful of three dimensions of a meaningful reform effort. First is
the process of reform: who should initiate it, who should participate
in the decision-making, and who should be invited to offer comments,
expert opinions, or other guidance? I suggest that the Board and the
Bar together undertake a proactive collaboration to formulate a new
fitness inquiry with input from knowledgeable and interested parties
without undue delay. Second are the principles of reform: what basic
principles should guide and inform any discussion of mental health
inquiries? I propose three: a focus on the necessity of the questions,
an appreciation of the risks and costs of deterring applicants from
seeking treatment, and a commitment to tailor the inquiries in order
to seek and obtain only that information that is needed and only
when it is needed. The third dimension of this undertaking involves
specific proposals for reform: within the discretion allowed by the
ADA, what inquiries and investigations would best protect the public
from unfit lawyers while respecting applicants' privacy and
encouraging sound mental health maintenance? I conclude that the
approach that is most consistent with the letter and intent of the
ADA and truest to our ideals and practices as lawyers is to ask only
about conduct and behavior-the best predictors of an applicant's
future behavior-unless and until there is convincing empirical
evidence that status-based questions (e.g., the status of being a mental
health consumer) are necessary to protect the public from unfit
lawyers.
A. The Process of Reform
The Bar should be proactive, reviewing and revising the bar
application as soon as possible rather than waiting to respond to an
ADA lawsuit.'52 The Board and the Bar together could initiate
152. At least one North Carolina bar applicant has considered a lawsuit. In 1995, an
applicant retained counsel to challenge the then-current question (question 24(b)) about
regular treatment- defined as more than four visits in a year-for "amnesia, or any form
of insanity, emotional disturbance, nervous or mental disorder." Stuart C. Gauffreau, The
Propriety of Broadly Worded Mental Health Inquiries on Bar Application Forms, 24 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 199, 199 (1996). The applicant's affirmative answer to this
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reform, taking their lead from any number of existing sources,
including case law; U.S. Department of Justice regulations, guidance
and litigation positions; the consensus position of the AALS, the
ABA, and the NCBE; the recent experiences of other states; and
North Carolina's own experiences in identifying bar applicants who
present a fitness risk.
Successful models of responsiveness exist, starting with the
actions of bar admissions officials in the District of Columbia. Shortly
before the ADA was to take effect, a mental health advocacy group
wrote to the District of Columbia Committee on Admissions
("Committee") and to the chief judge of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, asserting that the mental health questions on the
bar application violated Title II of the ADA.153 In short order, the
court of appeals directed the Committee to eliminate a question
about outpatient treatment or counseling and to limit the substance
abuse and inpatient treatment questions to the preceding five years. 54
Writing about the Committee's readiness to change the questions,
question subjected him to a hearing. Id. In response to a request from his attorney, the
DOJ stated in an opinion letter that this and other questions " 'appear problematic
because they fail to focus on current impairment.' " Id. at 217 n.119 (quoting Letter from
Sheila M. Foran, DOJ, Re: Mental Health and Substance Abuse Inquiries on North
Carolina Bar Exam Application Form, 1 (Sept. 29, 1995)). The applicant ultimately
decided not to sue after the Board deemed him fit to practice law and revised its
questionnaire to omit question 24(b). Id. at 199. The Board replaced question 24(b) with
the current questions 27, 28, 30 and 31. Id. at 217 n.119.
While North Carolina's fitness inquiry has not yet been the subject of a lawsuit, it
has been the subject of concern. In his thoughtful analysis of the legal and equitable issues
surrounding mental health inquiries on bar applications, North Carolina lawyer Stuart
Gauffreau recounts the work of University of North Carolina law professor Daniel H.
Pollitt. Id. at 200-01. In 1992, Professor Pollitt sought to have the questions removed or
revised, criticizing them as stigmatizing, overly intrusive under the ADA, inaccurate as a
means to identify unfit applicants, disrespectful of applicants' privacy, and ineffective at
ensuring lawyer fitness, in that they deterred law students from seeking treatment that
would help them maintain their mental and emotional fitness. Id. at 200. To buttress his
contentions, Professor Pollitt offered, among other things, an affidavit from psychiatrist
Robert N. Golden of the University of North Carolina School of Medicine. Dr. Golden
advised that requiring applicants to release treatment records would result in the
disclosure of intensely private matters that have no bearing on an applicant's fitness to
practice law. Id. at 201. He equated regular mental health care with regular physical
health care and stated that the decision to seek counseling often reflects insight and
maturity. Id. Flagging mental health treatment as a sign of possible lawyer unfitness
reflected "the lingering fear, ignorance, and prejudice that still surrounds psychiatry and
psychotherapy." Id.
153. Reischel, supra note 23, at 10 & 22 n.3. The application asked three "have you
ever" questions taken from the NCBE standard application: one dealing with substance
abuse disorders, one with inpatient treatment for mental disorders, and one with any
treatment or counseling for any mental, emotional or nervous disorder. Id. at 10.
154. Id. at 10 & 22 n.3.
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counsel to the Committee explained that the treatment question
added little, if any, marginal benefit because applicants' significant
mental health problems "[a]lmost always ... ha[d] been signaled by
responses to other questions (about arrests, crimes, debt, litigation,
discipline, etc.)."' 55
Other states have revised their questionnaires through
cooperative efforts by members of the state bar, the board of law
examiners, the state's law school faculties, civil rights organizations,
and past and prospective applicants. In Maryland, for example, the
board of law examiners narrowed its mental health inquiries at the
request and recommendation of two organizations, the state bar's
Section on Legal Education and the Clinical Law Office of the
University of Maryland Law School. The clinic, representing an
applicant whose admission had been delayed because of her history of
mental health treatment, elected to pursue this non-adversarial
approach partly in recognition of the common ground shared by bar
applicants, bar members, and bar examiners.'56
Elsewhere, resolution and accord have not come easily. The
Connecticut Bar Examining Committee ("CBEC") has defended
against numerous ADA lawsuits during the past twelve years.' 7 One
lawsuit settled only after public hearings demonstrated widespread
support for reform."8 The CBEC scheduled the hearings at the
urging of the federal judge handling an ADA lawsuit challenging that
state's questions-the third such challenge filed in three years.'59 Two
public hearings and many written submissions revealed nearly
unanimous opposition to the challenged questions. 6 ° Opponents
included psychiatrists, mental health organizations, state agencies, bar
applicants, the U.S. Department of Justice, practicing attorneys, and
155. Id. at 20. Elsewhere, plaintiffs have demonstrated the efficacy of conduct-related
questions. See, e.g., Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 445 (E.D. Va.
1995) (citing the lack of evidence that the challenged mental health question revealed any
mental illness that other questions could not as easily uncover).
156. Herr, supra note 4, at 655-65 (discussing the clinic's strategy of pursuing reform
without litigation). The results were not all that the clinic had hoped to achieve, but its
director nonetheless considered the process a "win-win" situation. Id. at 665.
157. See Bauer, supra note 26, at 106, 109 (discussing four lawsuits-filed by Doe, Roe,
Anonymous, and Szarlan-initiated between 1992 and 1994); id. at 116-19 (discussing
Rose Gower's 2000 lawsuit); id. at 119-25 (discussing Kathleen Flaherty's 2000 lawsuit).
158. Id. at 107-08. The lawsuit challenged a "have you ever" question about outpatient
treatment for any "mental, emotional or nervous disorder." Id. at 109 n.5 1.
159. See id. at 108-09.
160. The lone statement supporting the questions came from the Florida Board of Law
Examiners. See id. at 108 n.48. Florida subsequently lost two ADA challenges to its own
questions. Id. at 126-27.
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others.'61 Following these hearings, the CBEC settled the lawsuit
with a consent decree.
162
In Rhode Island, the Character and Fitness Committee reform
was achieved by court order, this time in advance of an ADA lawsuit
rather than in response to one. When the Rhode Island affiliate of
the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") asked the committee
to revise the mental health questions to comply with the ADA, the
committee sought direction from the Supreme Court of Rhode Island,
which deferred the matter pending the committee's "fact-finding and
revision process. ' 163 When the committee and the ACLU could not
agree on new questions, the court appointed a special master, who
had both legal and medical degrees, to receive public comments,
analyze the permissibility of the challenged questions, and make
recommendations about new inquiries. 64  A leading mental health
161. Id. at 108. Professor Jon Bauer, who represented the plaintiff, reported that the
reform effort benefited greatly from the formal and informal involvement of many
members of the legal community, including the chief justice of the state supreme court, a
law school dean, the state bar association's Committee on Disability Law and Section on
Human Rights and Responsibilities, and the Civil Rights and Disability Law Clinics of the
University of Connecticut School of Law. See id. at 106 n.41, 107 n.45, 108 n.47.
162. Id. at 108-09. The settlement required the CBEC to eliminate a broad treatment-
based question: "Have you ever been treated as an outpatient for any mental, emotional
or nervous disorders?" Id. at 109 n.51 (citing Szarlan v. Conn. Bar Exam. Comm., No.
3:94CV-160 (D. Conn. June 26, 1994) (stipulation and order of dismissal)). The CBEC
replaced it with the following question: "Since you became a law student, have you ever
had an emotional disturbance, mental illness or physical impairment which has impaired
or would impair your ability to practice law or to function as a student of law?" Id. at 108,
109 n.51 (citing Szarlan (No. 3:94CV-160)).
Unfortunately for the reform advocates, while the consent decree prohibited the
use of the old question, it did not direct the use of any specific new questions. Thus it did
not bar the CBEC from revising its application two years later to require disclosure of
certain diagnoses, even absent any current impairment. Id. at 109. The CBEC later added
"clinical depression" to the list of diagnoses that had to be disclosed, prompting forceful
objections from the president of the Connecticut Bar Association and the president pro
tempore of the state senate, among others. Id. at 111. In the face of intense public
criticism, the CBEC deleted the reference to depression the following year. Id. at 112.
The CBEC remains inexplicably committed to its status-based mental health
questions. To this day, it asks applicants whether they have ever been hospitalized for
mental illness, have ever been treated or counseled for substance abuse, or within the
preceding five years have been diagnosed or treated for specified mental disorders.
CONN. BAR EXAMINING COMM., APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE AS AN
ATTORNEY IN CONNECTICUT BY EXAMINATION, http://www.jud.state.ct.us/CBEC/insta
dmisap.htm#Form (last visited May 17, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
163. See In re Petition and Questionnaire for Admission to the R.I. Bar, 658 A.2d 894,
895 (R.I. 1995). The court also granted the ACLU amicus status. Id.
164. Id. (appointing a special master to "receive input from members of the community
whose interests may be affected and whose participation may better inform us as to the
value and propriety of the queries"). The special master received briefs and comments
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advocate and legal scholar praised this process for shedding light on
stereotypes and myths, offering "political 'cover' for the committee to
make extensive changes in the questions ... [and] reassuring the
public that it could have 'competent counsel while protecting the
individual applicant from unnecessary intrusions into his or her zone
of privacy.' 1165 The court endorsed the special master's
determination that the challenged questions violated the ADA and
ordered the bar examiners to limit their inquiry to two questions
related to any conditions that, in the applicant's own assessment,
would affect her ability to practice law.166
North Carolina would be well advised to pursue the receptive,
cooperative approach to reform modeled by the District of Columbia
and Maryland licensing boards, which responded promptly and
positively to requests to bring their bar application inquiries into
compliance with the ADA. 67 It would be a mistake, however, to
from, among others, the United States Department of Justice, the Governor's Commission
on the Handicapped, the Rhode Island Association of Social Workers, the Rhode Island
Psychiatric Society, and numerous mental health treatment and advocacy groups. In re
Petition and Questionnaire for Admission to the R.I. Bar, 683 A.2d 1333, 1335 (R.I. 1996).
165. Herr, supra note 4, at 669-70 (quoting In re Petition and Questionnaire for
Admission to the RI. Bar, 658 A.2d at 896); see id. at 669 (praising this process for creating
a "a model of organized fact finding and a climate for 'meaningful dialogue' among 'all
interested members of the community' ").
166. In re Petition and Questionnaire for Admission to the RI. Bar, 683 A.2d at 1337.
Other states have revised their questions through negotiations or settlement agreements
with the U.S. Department of Justice. See, e.g., Letter from Merrily A. Friedlander, Acting
Chief, Coordination and Review Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department
of Justice, to Stephen C. Villarreal, Chairman, Committee on Character and Fitness,
Arizona State Supreme Court (Nov. 7, 1994) (noting agreement to replace questions based
on treatment history or on current conditions that "might" affect the applicant's ability to
"engage in the continuous practice of law" with questions based on conduct, rather than
status), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/foia/lof038.txt (last visited June, 30, 2003) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
In Minnesota, reform came about when law school deans and professors
petitioned the Supreme Court of Minnesota to direct the board of law examiners to
eliminate the bar application questions about mental health treatment. In re Frickey, 515
N.W.2d 741, 741 (Minn. 1994). The court so ordered, "finding that the prospect of having
to answer the mental health questions ... causes many law students not to seek necessary
counseling.., and believing that questions relating to conduct can, for the most part, elicit
the information necessary ... to protect the public from unfit practitioners." Id. The
court was exercising its discretion to grant the order based on policy concerns; it did not
address the permissibility of the questions under the Minnesota Human Rights Act or the
federal and state constitutions, and, indeed, it questioned whether the ADA applied. Id.
167. In the District of Columbia, mental health advocates wrote to the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals and bar admissions committee in September 1991 and
January 1992; the questions were revised by February 1992. Reischel, supra note 23, at 10
& 22 n.3. In Maryland, the law examiners took only a week to admit the applicant whose
denial of admission prompted the request for reform; they revised their questions eight
months later. Herr, supra note 4, at 660. Rhode Island's reform took longer. The state
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delay review and reform for protracted hearings. Rather, the Board
or the Bar could set a reasonable time period to collect comments and
suggestions from concerned and knowledgeable individuals and
organizations 68 and then use those contributions to supplement the
information and guidance produced by a full decade of judicial,
medical, professional, and scholarly responses to concerns about
sweeping mental health inquiries for bar applicants.
B. Principles for Reform
Eliminating the existing over-broad mental health questions is
just the starting point. The more challenging task is shaping a new
fitness review. Three principles should inform North Carolina's
consideration of the precise content and structure of this review
procedure. First and foremost, we must be confident that the mental
health questions on the application are "necessary," that is, that they
are relevant to an applicant's current fitness to practice law, and that
they serve to detect unfitness that would not otherwise be revealed by
conduct-related questions. Second, we should assess the questions'
potential long-term effects on lawyer impairment, bearing in mind
that the message a bar applicant receives about the profession's
attitude toward mental disorders and mental health treatment may
shape his future decisions about treatment. Third, whatever
questions are included must be carefully worded, and any follow-up
inquiries and investigations should proceed incrementally and
judiciously in order to require the disclosure of only that information
that is necessary to the Board's fitness determination.
1. Focus on "Necessity"
Because the touchstone of a question's validity is "necessity," a
clear appreciation of this concept should precede discussion of any
specific inquiries. A first step might be to ask "necessary for what
purpose?" The Board's character and fitness review is limited to the
applicant's present fitness, so questions must be necessary to
ACLU first asked the Rhode Island Character and Fitness Committee for revisions in
February 1993, and the state supreme court did not issue its order revising the
questionnaire until October 1996. In re Petition and Questionnaire for Admission to the
R.I. Bar, 658 A.2d at 895.
168. These might include mental health professionals, law school deans, law school
faculty and administrators who counsel students, past and present officials of the North
Carolina Bar, the directors of the Lawyer Assistance Program, bar disciplinary officials,
members of the bar, recent and prospective bar applicants, and interested sections of the
North Carolina Bar Association, such as the Section on the Quality of Life and the
BarCARES program.
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determine present fitness to practice law.'69 The standard is not
whether the bar examiners are confident (much less certain) that the
applicant will maintain a high level of functioning over time."'° No
applicant presents such a guarantee. Illness, accident, or personal or
family trauma could diminish any lawyer's functioning at any time.' 17
Moreover, the Board's sole concern is evidence of actual present
impairment that bears on fitness to practice law. Thus, questions
about current impairment must address professional functioning, not
an applicant's personal dysfunction or distress. An applicant's
personal struggles with marital discord, sexual dysfunction, or self-
esteem are just that: personal. 172 The same is true for conditions that
may constrict a person's employment or other life options but do not
render her unfit to practice law. Consider a law student or lawyer
169. See Applicants v. Tex. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, No. A93 CA 740 SS, 1994 WL
923404, at *1 (W.D. Tex Oct. 11, 1994) (noting that mental health inquiry is relevant only
where board can "identify a clear and rational connection between the applicant's present
mental or emotional condition and the likelihood that the applicant will not discharge
properly the applicant's responsibilities to a client, a court, or the legal profession if the
applicant is licensed to practice law." (emphasis added)); ABA Resolution, supra note 11,
at 598 (questions must be germane to the applicant's "current qualifications to practice
law" (emphasis added)); APA GUIDELINES, supra note 11. Fitness, recall, includes the
abilities to reason, communicate, accurately perceive and understand facts and
circumstances, and to perform legal tasks in a timely manner. See N.C. BAR
APPLICATION, supra note 3, at 4 (Character and Fitness Guidelines).
170. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM'RS, THE BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK
73:8302 (Stuart Duhl ed., 3d ed. 1991) (stating that examining boards should not consider
themselves responsible for assuring the public that an applicant who, at the time of
admission, "is doing what is necessary to maintain his recovery" will not relapse in the
future because "[flitness ... relates to the applicant's integrity and character today").
Predictions about future conduct of any sort are dubious enterprises, even in the hands of
mental health professionals. See Ann Hubbard, The ADA, the Workplace, and the Myth of
the "Dangerous Mentally Ill," 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 849, 885-92 (2001) (discussing the
complexity and uncertainty of attempting to predict violent behavior by persons with
diagnosed mental disorders).
171. Indeed, given that depression, substance abuse and other disorders occur
frequently among lawyers and may appear after years of practice, perhaps the only
certainty for bar examiners is that some significant number of applicants who are fit today
will face impairment tomorrow. That impairment is properly addressed by lawyer
assistance programs and bar disciplinary schemes, not by the bar application.
172. This was a central concern in Doe v. Judicial Nominating Commission of the
Fifteenth Judicial District of Florida, 906 F. Supp. 1534 (S.D. Fla. 1995). The court
concluded that "It]he inquiry into 'any hospital confinement,' 'any form of mental illness,'
[and] 'any form of emotional disorder or disturbance,' vividly demonstrate[d] the over-
inclusiveness of the mental health questions," as it could require disclosure of family
counseling or "hospitalization or treatment resulting from personal traumas such as
childhood sexual abuse or loss of a loved one." Id. at 1544-45 (quoting application
questions) (alteration in original). The court was perplexed by the point of such inquiries:
"How such events and conditions could possibly be considered reasonably related to an
individual's capacity to perform as a judge eludes this court." Id. at 1545.
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with chronic depression or chronic fatigue syndrome that leaves her
little energy or motivation for anything outside her work or that
prompts her to choose part-time work. Her stamina is limited, but
her thinking is clear, her communication effective, her judgment
sound, and she undertakes obligations that are suited to her abilities
and her needs. She is fit to practice law.
A second step to gauging the necessity of mental health
questions is to determine whether the existing conduct-related
questions suffice to alert the Board to applicants who need a harder
look. If so, the mental health questions are unnecessary. The North
Carolina bar application currently inquires exhaustively into many
aspects of an applicant's conduct, including: past and present family
relationships and responsibilities;173 academic performance and
educational record, including actions that reflect poorly on the
applicant or led to discipline;174 military record;175 complete work
history; employment problems;'76 proof of good character;'77 adverse
judgments or claims or demands; financial or credit problems;'78
litigation history;79 criminal and traffic records; 80 and, where
applicable, record of practice in other jurisdictions. 8 ' In addition, the
applicant must obtain certificates of good moral character from four
people and provide the names of eight others who will serve as
character references. 182 These questions can be expected to produce
evidence of most-if not all-conduct that discloses poor judgment,
impaired cognition, a lack of maturity or responsibility, a skewed
perception of reality, unprofessional behavior, financial irregularities
or irresponsibility, erratic academic or professional performance,
173. N.C. BAR APPLICATION, supra note 3, at 6 (General Application). Question 3
inquires about current and prior marriages, separation, divorce, alimony, or support
payments and requests documentation related to terminated relationships or ongoing
support obligations. Id.
174. Id. at 7 (asking, among other things, whether the applicant has ever been
"dropped, suspended, warned, placed on scholastic or disciplinary probation, expelled or
requested to resign from any school"; been charged with an honor code violation; or failed
to answer truthfully all questions on admissions applications).
175. Id. at 9 (asking about Selective Service registration, court-martials, and military
discharge).
176. Id. at 10-11 (asking if the applicant has been discharged from employment or
asked to resign from a job).
177. Id. at 11 (asking about license denials or suspensions for lack of good character).
178. Id. at 13-15 (inquiring into bankruptcy filings, delinquent taxes, student loan
defaults, current indebtedness, and revoked or suspended credit cards).
179. Id. at 15-16.
180. N.C. BAR APPLICATION, supra note 3, at 15-17.
181. Id. at 30-32.
182. Id. at 27-28.
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impulsiveness, a lack of regard for others, or other personal traits,
tendencies, or behaviors that warrant further inquiry to determine the
applicant's fitness to practice law. If the Board's experience were to
prove these conduct-related questions inadequate to call attention to
applicants who may pose a risk to the public, it should first attempt to
revise these questions to make them more effective before it resorts
to mental health status questions.
2. Weigh the Long-Term Costs of Deterrence Against Immediate
Gains in Detection
While necessity is the threshold of permissibility, the second
principle-careful consideration of the long-term effects on overall
lawyer impairment-goes more to the wisdom and desirability of
mental health questions. Instead of asking whether a mental health
inquiry is merely acceptable, North Carolina should ask whether it is
optimal for removing the stigma of mental health diagnoses and
treatment and encouraging the responsible use of mental health
services. This approach weighs the long-term costs of questions that
discourage treatment against the benefits (if any) those questions
provide for detecting unfit applicants. Doing so honors the Bar's
laudable commitment to reducing lawyer impairment through
education, confidential peer support, and early intervention.
The Lawyer Assistance Program ("LAP") embodies that
commitment and reflects sensitivity to the principle proposed here.
LAP and its component organizations, Positive Action for Lawyers
("PALS") and FRIENDS,183 provide confidential support and
assistance to lawyers confronting, living with, or in recovery from
mental disorders or substance abuse.184 LAP uses peer support,
referrals, and intervention to help a lawyer maintain or regain her
professional functioning, preferably before she disserves her clients,
neglects her professional responsibilities, or damages her professional
standing or personal life. All information received by LAP-from
lawyers, concerned colleagues, friends, or family members-is kept
confidential under the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct.185
Nothing is disclosed to the Bar's disciplinary organization. This
guarantee of confidentiality encourages lawyers to seek early
treatment without risking damaged reputations or intrusive
183. For a description of PALS and FRIENDS, see N.C. State Bar, LAP/PALS/
FRIENDS, at http://www.ncbar.com/home/pal.asp (last visited June 10, 2003) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
184. Id.
185. See N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 27, r. 1D.0613 (June 2002).
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investigations into personal matters.
This approach weighs the long-term costs of mental health
questions against their benefits (if any) in detecting unfit applicants.
The principle can be simply stated: in reducing lawyer impairment,
the long term matters, and in the long term, confidentiality
encourages treatment while disclosure deters treatment. Deterring
treatment results in more lawyers with untreated or uncontrolled
mental disorders, which produces greater lawyer impairment, which
in turn increases the risk of injured and disserved clients.
186
The Bar also encourages treatment through programs that
educate lawyers about mental disorders and seek to remove the
stigma and prejudice surrounding them. One significant step is the
requirement, imposed in 2002, that lawyers take one hour of
continuing legal education on substance abuse and debilitating mental
conditions every three years.' This instruction can help lawyers
recognize the symptoms of depression and other disorders in
themselves, their colleagues, and their clients; overcome prejudices
and stereotypes about mental disorders; learn about treatment and
prevention programs; support the recovery efforts of their peers; and
examine the effect of mental disorders on a lawyer's professional
responsibilities.
The Bar, through its Quality of Life Task Force ("Task Force"),
also has emphasized the importance of removing mental health
stigma and encouraging mental health treatment. The Task Force's
1991 report and recommendations included the goal of "remov[ing]
counseling stigma," and it challenged bar organizations, law firms, law
schools, and individuals to do their part.'88 Notably, it called on bar
186. In a similar context, the Supreme Court has recognized that protecting an
individual's privacy with respect to mental health treatment may also protect public
interests. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1996) (recognizing that the fear of
disclosure undermines effective mental health treatment, and that deterring public
servants, such as police officers, from seeking or receiving effective treatment risks
compromising the public safety).
187. tit. 27, r. 1D.1518. Other means of educating and enlightening lawyers include the
features and columns about recovery that appear regularly in the Bar's quarterly
magazine. See, e.g., Anonymous, Before and After, N.C. STATE BAR J., Spring 2003, at 33.
188. N. C. BAR ASS'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE
TASK FORCE 1, 17 (1991). The Task Force encouraged law schools to "[m]ake counseling
readily available, encourage its use and remove any stigma associated with it by making it
a normal function in the educational process." Id. at 24. It called on law firms to
"[p]romote an environment where lawyers seek professional counseling without stigma ...
through adoption of an EAP [employee assistance program], participation in Bar support
programs or establishment of relationships with counselors." Id. at 21. It also urged
individual members of the profession to "utilize appropriate counseling, therapy and peer
support." Id. at 27.
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organizations "[t]hrough proper means, [to] re-examine language of
the North Carolina State Bar Application regarding the history of
counseling question, or otherwise eliminate any inference of stigma
arising from counseling." '189
Concerns that stigma and fear of disclosure deter people from
seeking mental health treatment are well-placed. The U.S. Surgeon
General, in his groundbreaking 1999 report on mental health,
reported that the majority of Americans who experience depression
will not seek treatment, in large part due to the fear of being
stigmatized.19° Research indicates that people will be less likely to
seek treatment, or less likely to reveal sensitive information in
treatment, if they believe the information may be disclosed to
others. 191 An AALS survey of students at nineteen law schools
confirms this pattern in law students.192 Students were four times
more likely to seek help from a law school or university substance
abuse program if given the assurance that they would not have to
report the treatment and bar officials would not learn of it.' 93 The
guarantee of confidentiality more than doubled their willingness to
refer a fellow law student for substance abuse treatment.
94
The personal and professional costs of deterring mental health
treatment are amplified by the high incidence of depression, anxiety,
and stress-related symptoms among law students. As many as one-
third of first-year law students experience significantly elevated levels
of depressive symptoms, and as many as two in five graduate from
law school-and enter the profession-in the same condition. 95 Law
students fare no better once they become lawyers.'96 Studies suggest
that depression rates for lawyers are three times higher than for other
professionals' 97 and double that of the general population. 198
189. Id. at 17.
190. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 7, at 22.
191. Id. at 6.
192. Ass'n of Am. Law Schools, Report of the AALS Special Committee on Problems of
Substance Abuse in Law Schools, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 35, 36 (1994).
193. Id. at 55.
194. Id.
195. G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Role of Legal Education in Producing
Psychological Distress Among Law Students and Lawyers, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
225, 246-47 (1986) (noting that twenty to forty percent of law students report an increase
in depression, anxiety, and other stress-related symptoms once they begin law school).
196. Beck, supra note 31, at 2-3 (noting that, not surprisingly, "nearly 70% of lawyers
are likely candidates for alcohol-related problems" during their careers).
197. See Bauer, supra note 26, at 161 n.220 (citing Eaton et al., supra note 30 at 1081,
1083).
198. Benjamin et al., supra note 29, at 240-41 (finding that lawyers in the State of
Washington experienced symptoms of depression or substance abuse at a rate double the
22212003]
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Against well-founded concerns about stigma and deterrence and
their detrimental effect on lawyer impairment, there is little or no
evidence that status-based questions related to diagnosis or treatment
disclose any impairment that is not already revealed or suggested by
conduct-related questions. Time after time, a thoughtful review of
the evidence-whether trial testimony or public submissions-has
revealed that mental health status questions offer little appreciable
benefit at considerable personal and professional cost.199 There is no
reason to believe the calculus is different in North Carolina. Statistics
recently compiled by Fred P. Parker III, Executive Director of the
Board, show that 3,976 applicants applied to the Bar in the three-year
period of 2000 to 2002.200 Of those nearly four thousand applicants,
only six were denied licenses on "character and fitness grounds. 20'
The report does not separate denials based on character from those
based on fitness or on some combination of the two. 0 2 It may be that
none of the six applicants even presented a mental health issue.
Many or even all may have been denied on character grounds, based
on evidence of unlawful conduct; academic misconduct; a lack of
candor on a law school application or the bar application; any act
involving dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation; or neglect of
financial or professional responsibilities. 2 3
Moreover, the relevant question is not whether any of the
excluded applicants happened to have a diagnosis or history of a
mental disorder, but rather whether any of them would have escaped
detection but for an affirmative answer to one of the triggering
mental health questions. In other words, did any of these applicants
answer "yes" to one of questions 26 through 32, yet have nothing else
in his or her file that would have alerted bar examiners to a potential
lack of fitness? And even assuming (against all odds) that all of these
applicants were detected solely because of their mental health
national average).
199. See, e.g., Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 445-46 (E.D. Va.
1995) (balancing the "stigmatizing and inhibiting effect" of a mental health treatment
question against the "insignificant results it achieves"); Bauer, supra note 26, at 164 ("The
costs of deterring treatment, both in terms of future lawyers' health and the potential
adverse effect on their performance as attorneys, easily wipe out the benefits of any small
gains in screening efficacy that might be claimed for depression inquiries.").
200. Letter from Fred P. Parker III, to E.D. Gaskins, Jr. (July 5, 2002) (discussing
North Carolina Board of Law Examiners Character and Fitness Evaluations, 2000-02) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See N.C. BAR APPLICATION, supra note 3, at 1 (Character and Fitness
Guidelines).
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records, we still must ask whether the identification of roughly two
applicants a year makes the questions necessary or advisable, when
weighed against the costs of deterring greater numbers of applicants
from seeking treatment and of stigmatizing mental disorders and
mental health treatment in the eyes of nearly four thousand
applicants.
3. Carefully Tailor and Thoughtfully Structure Mental Health
Inquiries
Whatever mental health information the Board decides to
require, the mental health questions and any follow-up inquiries and
investigations must be tailored to require disclosure of only that
information that is needed, and only when it is needed. This requires
careful attention to the wording of the inquiries (what is asked);
which applicants, based on all available information, will be required
to answer the inquiries (who is asked); and the point at which the
information is deemed necessary (when it is asked). This care is
necessary to protect applicants from compelled disclosure of
information that the Board itself does not deem relevant or
necessary.
Questions should be written with awareness that applicants
mindful of the duty of candor may feel compelled to "over-
disclose."" Ambiguities in the existing mental health questions on
the North Carolina bar application invite such overdisclosure.
Question 30, for example, asks if the applicant has ever been
"voluntarily committed" to any "outpatient ... facility" for
"treatment or evaluation.""2 5  Applicants and mental health
professionals both might wonder precisely what this means.206 Does it
require disclosure of garden-variety counseling for stress or related
concerns? Because the question addresses outpatient treatment and
visits for simple evaluation, even absent any diagnosis or diagnosable
204. Id. (citing Character and Fitness director's admission that the question "m[ight] be
overbroad in that it elicits unnecessary and unintended mental health information"); Tex.
State Bd. of Law Exam'rs v. Malloy, 793 S.W.2d 753, 760 (Tex. App. 1990) (noting that,
"[flar from failing to disclose or cooperate," the resistant applicant "over disclosed"
concerning a private matter not related to any legitimate inquiry by the Board).
205. N.C. BAR APPLICATION, supra note 3, at 21 (General Application).
206. Similarly, question 31 asks if the applicant has ever been "admitted" to an
"outpatient mental health facility or substance abuse facility" for "treatment or
evaluation" at "the request of any person other than yourself." Id. at 22. What scenario is
envisioned with respect to "the request" of "any other person"? That the other person (a
parent, perhaps) asked the facility to admit the applicant? Or simply that the other person
encouraged the applicant to go for evaluation?
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disorder, applicants who fail to report such counseling do so at their
own peril. It is inconceivable, however, that the Board would assert
that mere situational counseling in any way suggests an applicant's
unfitness to practice law.
2°7
Even if the initial application asks only about conduct, an
applicant's responses to those questions-disclosing recent academic
slumps, workplace difficulties, erratic or self-destructive behavior,
convictions for drunk driving, complaints of assaultive or disruptive
behavior-can raise concerns about his judgment, reliability, self-
control, or mental or emotional stability. At this point, the Board
may have the need-and indeed the duty-to inquire into the
applicant's current functioning or impairment, including his mental
health.2 8  Even then, the principle of necessity must constrain the
scope and sequencing of those follow-up inquiries or investigations.
Assume, for example, that an applicant discloses her treatment
for bipolar disorder, along with details of how she successfully
manages her condition and assurances of her continued treatment
compliance. What more, if anything, does the Board need to know?
Who should make this determination? And under what standards?
These questions point to another problematic aspect of fitness
screening: the people making these complex predictions and
determinations have no training in psychiatry, psychology, medicine,
social work, substance abuse, or any related discipline. Professor
(and later AALS President) Deborah Rhode leveled this criticism
207. A preamble to questions 26 through 32 takes pains to assure applicants that "the
Board looks favorably on applicants' self-recognition of their need for treatment and
appropriate utilization of services." Id. at 19. Moreover, the Board's Executive Director,
Fred P. Parker III, regularly visits the states' law schools and makes a point of telling
prospective bar applicants that the Board does not intend to seek disclosure of "short-
term" or "situational" counseling for "family stress, exam stress, grief ... or related
matters." E-mail from Fred P. Parker III, Executive Director, Bd. of Law Exam'rs of the
State of N.C., to Ann Hubbard, Associate Professor of Law, U.N.C. School of Law (July
14, 2003, 08:45:05 EST) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). This might be a
welcome exception but for its uncertainty. What is "short term"? Six weeks, six months, a
year? What if the counseling is "situational," but the situation lasts several years?
Regardless, with so much at stake, a prudent bar applicant might not risk under-disclosure
or the serious charge of lack of candor by relying on an oral qualification to the written
question.
208. Dr. Howard V. Zonana, Director of the Law and Psychiatric Division and
Professor of Clinical Psychology at the Yale University School of Medicine, proposed this
kind of sequencing for bar fitness reviews. In expert testimony in the Clark case, he
testified that responses to behavioral, or "characterological," questions are the best
indicators of an applicant's present ability to function and work, but that mental health
inquiries may be required as a second stage of the application proceedings. See Clark v.
Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 436 & n.9 (E.D. Va. 1995).
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nearly two decades ago:
[W]hile mental stability is obviously relevant to practice,
current certification standards license untrained examiners to
draw inferences that the mental health community would itself
find highly dubious. As noted earlier, even trained clinicians
cannot accurately predict psychological incapacities based on
past treatment in most individual cases.
29
Lawyers are simply not equipped or qualified to make these
determinations. Even the most "enlightened" lawyers lack the
necessary training, and many may yet harbor misconceptions or
biases about mental disorders or simply lack imagination about how
certain conditions can be accommodated to-or even harnessed for-
the effective practice of law.210 Uninformed decisions about what is
relevant to a fitness determination can put unwarranted burdens on
applicants with mental disorders, up to and including the expense of
hiring counsel or a delay in admission to the bar.
To avoid these forms of disability discrimination, the fitness
screening process should rely on trained mental health professionals
to evaluate an applicant's current intellectual functioning, emotional
stability, and where applicable, short-term prognosis.21 1 The ADA
requires no less. The determination that a person with a disability
poses a direct threat to others must rely on "an individualized inquiry
and ... appropriate findings of fact .... 'based on reasonable medical
judgments given the state of medical knowledge ....' ",212
Let us assume that a qualified professional determines that more
information is needed about the applicant with bipolar disorder to
assess the applicant's control or management of her symptoms. To
avoid requiring disclosure of detailed private information irrelevant
to symptom management, the inquiry should proceed incrementally.
209. Rhode, supra note 5, at 581-82.
210. See, e.g., David L. Dunner & G. Andrew H. Benjamin, Bipolar Affective Disorder
(Manic Depressive Illness), 63 B. EXAMINER 25, 28 (Nov. 1994) (noting that trial lawyers
with bipolar disorder use their hypomania to maintain their energy during demanding
trials).
211. One model for accomplishing this, proposed by Professor Jon Bauer, would be to
formulate a medical questionnaire separate from the regular bar application and to have
applicants send this questionnaire directly to a medical office, not the bar examiners'
regular staff. Bauer, supra note 26, at 215-16. There are, of course, many ways to obtain
guidance from trained health professionals.
212. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1987) (quoting Brief
Amicus Curiae of American Medical Association, at 19); see also Bradgon v. Abbott, 524
U.S. 624, 649 (1998) (confirming that direct threat assessment must be based on
professionally accepted medical or other objective information (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at
288)).
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As a first step, the Board (or its agent) might write a letter to the
applicant's psychiatrist, asking the following question: "Is [the
applicant] presently fit to practice law, as the Board has defined
fitness in its character and fitness guidelines?" If the response is
"yes," the inquiry should end there. If the response is "no" or
equivocal, the Board might then ask for more detailed information
about the applicant's functioning and prognosis. The current
investigation procedures, by contrast, are devoid of any tailoring to
minimize unnecessary disclosures. The Board issues an open-ended
request for "any pertinent information" the psychiatrist possesses,
including her analysis of the applicant's "condition, treatment and
prognosis. '2 1  This request is likely to yield intensely personal
information that has no bearing on the applicant's present fitness to
practice law, including information that the Board itself would deem
irrelevant.
The Board loses little by abandoning its scattershot approach in
favor of a more tailored, incremental tack. The decision not to pose a
mental health question to all applicants does not preclude asking
those questions of selected applicants when the need arises.21 4
Admittedly, such a progressive inquiry could affect the Board's ability
to complete a thorough and timely review. But if the initial inquiries
are properly narrowed, the Board will seek, collect, and review
considerably less information at the preliminary stages, allowing it to
redirect its resources to the more intensive follow-up required for a
smaller number of files. If the sequencing of the inquiry simply
cannot be reconciled with the present schedule, the Board could set
an earlier application deadline or, better yet, adopt a pre-registration
scheme that allows students to begin the bar application process at
any time during law school.215  Regardless, considerations of
213. Letter to Health Care Provider, supra note 54.
214. For example, a mental disorder may have been a factor in a reported event, such
as academic probation, an arrest, or a firing. A proper understanding of the event and its
relevance to the applicant's current fitness may turn on the influence of the disorder,
whether it had been diagnosed at the time, whether the applicant responded by seeking
treatment, and whether the condition or disorder, if still present, is effectively controlled.
The mere disclosure of this disorder does not, however, open the door to any and all
questions about diagnoses and treatment. If, for example, bar examiners learn that a
responsible and upstanding applicant's uncharacteristic "youthful indiscretion" was fueled
by the applicant's undiagnosed or poorly controlled bipolar disorder, this alone would not
justify an inquiry into years of subsequent treatment. Rather, the scope of any further
inquiry should reflect whether an isolated, rare or remote event has actual significance to
the applicant's current fitness.
215. Sixteen states currently require or permit law students to register with their
licensing agencies during law school and before applying to the bar. NAT'L CONE. OF BAR
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administrative efficiency or convenience must yield to the ADA's
command that mental health inquiries be narrowly tailored.
2 16
C. Specific Proposals for Reform
Sound processes and solid principles provide the basis for
effective reform. The success of the reform effort then depends on
the quality of the proposals that those processes and principles yield.
A comprehensive reexamination of North Carolina's fitness screening
process for bar applicants could spark proposals to revise many
aspects and details of the application itself and the investigations that
follow from it. 17 At this stage, it is worth sketching out and analyzing
a spectrum of possibilities. At one end of that continuum lies
minimalist reform: proposals to make only those changes necessary
to bring North Carolina into grudging compliance with federal law.
At the other end of the continuum lies ambitious reform: proposals
calculated to honor the full breadth of the ADA's anti-discrimination
norms and the Bar's commitment to eliminating the stigma of mental
health diagnosis and treatment. Between these poles lie many
combinations of possible proposals. What follows is an introductory
exploration of that range of possible reforms, moving from the
EXAM'RS, LAW STUDENT REGISTRATION, at http://www.ncbex.org/character/
lawregister.htm (last visited June 10, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
Raleigh lawyer Ed Gaskins included this recommendation in the report he recently
submitted to the Board. Gaskins, supra note 55, at 29-30. This pre-registration or pre-
certification approach has obvious virtues. The Board would benefit from additional time
to conduct a thorough investigation. The student would benefit from receiving either
advance notice that she will not be admitted to the bar, or, alternatively, guidance about
how she might conduct herself in law school so as to demonstrate to the Board that she
has matured in her judgment, reformed her conduct, or otherwise rehabilitated herself.
For an explanation of how a similar two-tiered approach works in Texas, see Applicants v.
Tex. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, No. A93 CA 740 SS, 1994 WL 923404, at *2 (W.D. Tex.
Oct. 11 1994).
216. See Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 443 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(rejecting the board's argument about limited resources as a basis for making a question
"necessary" under Title I1).
217. Revising the mental health questions that appear on the initial application is only
the first step. In addition, the Board might revise, among other things, (1) the nature and
details of the information an applicant must provide to accompany an affirmative answer
to one of those questions; (2) the standards and procedures for determining which
applicants warrant further fitness scrutiny; (3) the nature and wording of the request for
information sent to an applicant's health care providers; (4) the breadth of the
authorization and release the applicant is required to sign; (5) the content and wording of
the conduct-related questions used to identify those applicants who may pose fitness risks;
(6) the definitions of character, fitness and impairment; (7) the content, organization and
wording of revised character and fitness guidelines that accentuate the distinction between
good moral character and mental fitness; and (8) the identities of the people who may see
and evaluate an applicant's private health or treatment information.
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minimalist toward the ambitious.
1. Make Minimal ADA-Mandated Changes
Review of the ADA case law demonstrates that the mental
health questions on the North Carolina bar application are
impermissible on two measures: the breadth of the conditions and
treatment included and the length of time covered. We can take
Texas Applicants as a rough measure of the outer reaches of
permissible questions. There, the state's counsel conceded, and the
judge concurred, that an earlier question-"Have you, within the last
ten years, been treated for any mental illness?"-violated the ADA
because it "intruded into an applicant's mental health history without
focusing on only those mental illnesses that pose a potential threat to
the applicant's present fitness to practice law." '218 Thus, North
Carolina's question 27, inquiring about impairment (or even alleged
impairment) from "any" psychiatric condition, fails even under Texas
Applicants.219 So, too, does question 31, which asks about outpatient
treatment, without regard to diagnosis and even in the absence of any
diagnosable disorder.22 °
Texas Applicants also demonstrates that North Carolina's "have
you ever" questions fail for want of reasonable time limits. 221 There
the court permitted the ten-year (or since adulthood) scope of the
question about so-called "serious mental illnesses" based on trial
testimony that the chronic nature and frequent adolescent onset of
these disorders made it necessary to reach back that far.222 The court
218. Applicants, 1994 WL 923404, at *7 (emphasis added) (noting that the question was
nearly identical to questions invalidated elsewhere).
219. N.C. BAR APPLICATION, supra note 3, at 23 (asking about any impairment).
Question 27, which asks about impairment from "medical, surgical, or psychiatric
conditions" does avoid the common problem of singling out mental impairment. See id.
220. Id. at 25.
221. Applicants, 1994 WL 923404, at *7 (concluding that questions regarding mental
illness may inquire only ten years into the past).
222. Id. The defendant's expert testified that five years was minimal, ten years
optimal. Id. Other states that ask a similar question, including Delaware, Kentucky,
Missouri, and Nebraska, limit the query to the preceding five years. BD. OF BAR
EXAM'RS OF THE SUP. CT. OF DEL., APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION 25 (2003),
http://courts.state.de.us/bbe (last visited July 13, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review); KY. OFFICE OF BAR ADMISSIONS, APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION BY
EXAMINATION SCR 2.022, at 26, http://www.kyoba.org/forms/baronlineapp.pdf (last
visited July 13, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); MO. BD. OF LAW
EXAM'RS, APPLICATION FOR CHARACTER AND FITNESS REPORT 9 (2003),
http://www.osca.state.mo.us/SUP/index.nsf/48152408327899bc8625673500728856/74d4967a
037ff17a8625696d006fb5a9/$FILE/_68cj4c821elo6oqb3c5q6irre_.pdf (last visited July 13,
2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); NEB. STATE BAR COMM'N, EXAM
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emphasized that this limited time period "simply encompass[ed] an
applicant's adult years, '223 and indeed, the board recently revised the
question to exclude information about inpatient treatment before the
age of eighteen.224 The court's careful justification of the ten-year
time period, emphasizing adult disorders, and its insistence that the
fitness inquiry be "narrowly focused" on diagnoses and treatment
relevant to present fitness to practice law,225 puts it at odds with North
Carolina's use of lifetime history questions.
Thus, to comply with even the most permissive interpretation of
the ADA, North Carolina would need at the very least to limit the
mental health inquiries to specific diagnoses within a recent period of
time. This incremental change, however, fails to address the danger
of deterrence that inheres in treatment questions-a prospect the
Texas Applicants court gave short shrift.226  Moreover, Texas
Applicants rested on expert testimony that the ten-year history was
necessary-a proposition that would need to be revisited in light of
current medical knowledge and treatment practices.227
2. Ask Narrowly Tailored Questions About Diagnosis and Treatment
If the Board did nothing more than modify the current questions
to bring them in line with Texas Applicants, the fitness inquiry might
satisfy the ADA, but it would do little to meet the Bar's goals of
removing the stigma attached to mental disorders and encouraging
early and effective treatment of these disorders, nor would it protect
bar applicants from the forced disclosure of irrelevant information.
The second and somewhat less intrusive option would be to retain
diagnosis and treatment questions but to tailor them more narrowly
by limiting them to shorter time periods, excluding outpatient
APPLICANT'S QUESTIONNAIRE, 10 (2003), http://www.nebar.com/memberinfo/nsbc/
Applications/NSBCApplicationExam05282002.pdf (last visited July 13, 2003) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
223. Applicants, 1994 WL 923404, at *7 n.14; id. at *9 (finding that the board
appropriately tailored the question by limiting it "to a specified time frame, primarily
spanning late adolescence and adult life").
224. Id. at *2 & n.4.
225. See id. at *1, *2, *4, *9 (advising that inquiries be narrowly focused on specific
mental illnesses).
226. See id. at *8 (observing cursorily that some individuals may defer treatment in
order to avoid answering these questions affirmatively).
227. Under the "direct threat" test, an applicant's risk must be assessed according to
the latest medical or other scientific information. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624,
649-50 (1998). The evidence presented in Texas Applicants is now nearly a decade old
and may not necessarily reflect current medical understanding or treatment of the
identified mental disorders.
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treatment, requiring the disclosure of fewer or narrower specific
diagnoses, or by using some other method. However the questions
are tailored, it is important to remember that because the Board's
sole fitness concern is current professional impairment, diagnoses and
treatment histories are relevant, if at all, only to the extent that they
provide information about the applicant's current level of functioning
or impairment as it would affect her ability to practice law. Both
diagnoses and treatment are poor indicators of current impairment.
Diagnoses are inadequate for several reasons. First, a diagnosis
generally reflects a cluster of symptoms, often requiring the presence
of several items from a larger menu of symptoms. Some symptoms
reflect how a person feels, not how she performs, much less how she
performs at work. 28 Thus, a person may have a diagnosed mental
disorder without having any of the associated symptoms that could
impair her ability to function as a lawyer. Second, a diagnosis refers
to the underlying condition without regard to the ameliorative effects
of medication or other treatment. A person diagnosed with major
depression may nonetheless control or eliminate the most debilitating
symptoms with antidepressants. Third, a diagnosis fails to account for
distinctions among individuals (each presenting a unique combination
of intellect, talent, character, education, insight, values, social
supports, coping mechanisms, and treatment compliance) and among
their disorders (which, even within a diagnosis, produce a diversity of
symptoms and functional impairments; different courses of illness,
including severity, chronicity, and recurrence; and varied responses to
treatment).
Consider bipolar disorder. Along with schizophrenia and "any
other psychotic disorders," bipolar disorder appears on many bar
examiners' lists of "serious mental illnesses." '229 Untreated bipolar
228. The American Psychiatric Association's DSM-IV, defines a mental disorder as "a
clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an
individual and that is associated with present distress ... or disability ... or with a
significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of
freedom." DSM-IV, supra note 31, at xxi. Thus, some diagnoses are based on behavioral
or psychological distress, or pain, rather than on "disability," which DSM-IV defines as an
"impairment in one or more important areas of functioning." Id.
229. This list appears in a question on the NCBE character and fitness questionnaire
that serves as a model for many states. NCBE CHARACTER REPORT, supra note 17, at 12
(describing question 25, which inquires about "bi-polar disorder, schizophrenia, paranoia,
or any other psychotic disorder"); see also N.C. BAR APPLICATION, supra note 3, at 24.
The reference to "any other psychotic disorder" could suggest that bipolar disorder is a
psychotic disorder. It is not. A psychotic disorder has psychosis as a defining feature.
DSM-IV, supra note 31, at 273. Yet the majority of people with bipolar disorder never
have a psychotic episode. One-third of people with bipolar disorder are diagnosed with
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disorder is characterized by alternating periods of depression and
either hypomania or mania.230 Mania warrants bar examiners'
concern. It can result in distractibility, poor concentration, "severely
compromised" judgment, and in severe episodes, hallucinations and
grandiose or paranoid delusions.231  Hypomania, by contrast,
generates "productive energy and heightened creativity" rather than
impaired judgment, and it never results in psychosis. 32 It is the
mania-not the hypomania, nor the bipolar disorder itself-that
poses a serious risk for clients. Yet many persons diagnosed with
bipolar disorder never experience manic episodes, 233 making bipolar
disorder an overbroad and inappropriate proxy for mania. If the bar
examiners' concern is about mania, the application should ask about
mania.
Treatment is no better an indicator of functional impairment and
may even be worse. First, asking about treatment fails to identify the
applicants who pose the greatest fitness risk-those with "untreated
or uncontrolled mental or emotional disorders. '234 Indeed, an inquiry
accurately targeted at the prospective lawyers most likely to endanger
their clients would read: "Have you (within some time period) failed
to seek treatment for any condition (mental or physical) that
significantly impaired your functioning and, had you been practicing
law, might have compromised your clients' interests? If your answer
is 'yes,' explain fully." Second, questions about treatment most
directly deter applicants from seeking treatment, resulting in more
lawyers with untreated impairments. The effect is perverse.235
bipolar II disorder, which means they have never had a single episode of either mania or
psychosis. Id. at 362; SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 7, at 249. Persons with a
diagnosis of bipolar I disorder have had at least one manic episode but may never have
exhibited any psychotic symptoms. DSM-IV, supra note 31, at 350-52 (noting that bipolar
I disorder is characterized by one or more manic episodes and that distinctions among
persons with bipolar I disorder include the presence or absence of psychotic symptoms).
230. See DSM-IV, supra note 31, at 328-38.
231. Id. at 328-30; SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 7, at 249.
232. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 7, at 249. Two experts on bipolar
disorder report that most lawyers with this hypomania "function quite well in their
occupations." Dunner & Benjamin, supra note 210, at 30. Indeed, trial lawyers may
effectively harness the "excess energy, decreased need for sleep, over talkativenss, and
increase in ability to interact with others" to get them through demanding trials. Id. at 28.
233. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
234. Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 433 (E.D. Va. 1995) (quoting
VA. BD. OF BAR EXAM'RS, APPLICANT'S CHARACTER AND FITNESS QUESTIONNAIRE);
see SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 7, at 18,226-27.
235. See Memorandum of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 32, Ellen S. v. Fl. Bd.
of Bar Exam'rs, 859 F. Supp. 1489 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (No. 94-0429-CIV-KING) ("[R]ather
than improving the quality of attorneys in the State, the Board's inquiries may have the
perverse effect of deterring those who could benefit from treatment from obtaining it,
2003] 2231
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Questions about diagnosis or treatment are also flawed in that
they rely on an applicant's status as a person with a diagnosed mental
disorder, a "former mental patient," a "mentally ill person," or a
consumer of mental health services, rather than on the applicant's
demonstrated abilities and actual conduct. 236 Worse, these questions
reflect and reinforce the broad, stigmatizing, and inaccurate
assumptions that the ADA aims to eradicate. Such assumptions are
especially unjustified where, as in the bar screening process, there is a
wealth of available information about how the individual actually
functions.
3. Ask About Current Impairment
Recognizing that treatment and diagnosis are flawed measures of
impairment, some bar examiners follow the APA and ABA
recommendations and limit mental health questions to current
impairment.237 For example, Alaska, Iowa, Rhode Island, and South
Carolina ask variations of the following question: "Are you currently
suffering from any disorder that impairs your judgment or that would
otherwise adversely affect your ability to practice law?
23
1
while penalizing those who enhance their ability to perform successfully as attorneys by
seeking counseling."), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/foia/flla.txt (last visited on Aug. 31, 2003)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Rhode, supra note 5, at 582 ("To the extent
that bar oversight deters psychological or psychiatric treatment, the current approach is
simply perverse. Penalizing those who recognize a need for assistance is unlikely to yield
greater mental health among the practicing bar.").
236. See Clark, 880 F. Supp. at 444 n.25 (noting the United States' assertion in Texas
Applicants that even "limited inquiry" into diagnosis violates Title II of ADA because the
status of having a diagnosis was an unnecessary classification).
237. APA GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 1; see also ABA Resolution, supra note 11, at
598 (advocating "specific, targeted questions about an applicant's behavior, conduct or
any current impairment of the applicant's ability to practice law").
238. See ALASKA BAR ASS'N, APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE ALASKA BAR
ASSOCIATION 15, http://www.alaskabar.org/library/barexamapplication.pdf (last visited
May 14, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); SUPREME COURT OF IOWA,
APPLICATION FOR THE IOWA BAR EXAMINATION 8, http://www.judicial.state.ia.us/regs/
barinfo/barexam.asp (last visited May 14, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); THE R. I. JUDICIARY, PETITION/QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ADMISSION TO THE
RHODE ISLAND BAR 21, http://www.courts.state.ri.us/supreme/bar/baradmission.htm (last
visited May 14, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); S. C. JUDICIAL
DEPT., SOUTH CAROLINA BAR APPLICATION 8, http://www.scd.uscourts.gov/
DOCS/admprac.pdf (last visited May 14, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
Some states combine questions about current impairment with time-limited
questions about treatment for serious disorders. See, e.g., N. J. COMM. ON CHARACTER,
CERTIFIED STATEMENT OF CANDIDATE 15 (inquiring into any twelve-month history of
hospitalization for serious mental illnesses; current professional impairment from
emotional, mental or nervous disorder), http://www.njbarexams.org/app/app-On.htm (last
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Such "self-assessment" questions have been criticized for giving
the applicant leeway to answer "no" by minimizing her degree of
impairment. 239 This may be true. The temptation not to disclose is
present (and apparently strong) with all mental health questions.
One close observer of mental health inquiries on bar applications has
described "mass noncompliance, a form of 'questionnaire
nullification.' "240 But other applicants, mindful of their duty of
visited May 14, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Wisconsin asks only
about actual impairment in recent years. See generally SUPREME COURT OF WIS. & BD.
OF BAR EXAM'RS, APPLICANT QUESTIONNAIRE AND AFFIDAVIT (allowing five-year
history of the applicant's assertion of impairment as defense, explanation or mitigation in
administrative, judicial or disciplinary proceedings or in academic or professional context;
twelve-month history of professional impairment; and exclusion of "therapy that is fairly
characterized as stress counseling, domestic counseling, grief counseling, or eating or
sleeping disorder counseling, as these are generally not viewed as germane to the issue of
whether and applicant is qualified to practice law"), http://www.courts.state.wi.us/bbel
pdf/bbe106.pdf (last visited Aug. 10, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
Maryland asks a question that initially appears to focus on current impairment. A
closer reading reveals that it requires disclosure of diagnoses and treatment. This results
from a hypothetical question about conditions that would produce impairment "if
untreated or not otherwise actively managed." MD. STATE BD. OF LAW EXAM'RS,
APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF MARYLAND., CHARACTER
QUESTIONNAIRE 11, http://www.courts.state.md.us/ble/download.html (last visited May
14, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). There is no apparent reason-
and certainly no conceivable need-to ask applicants, "Would you be impaired if you
didn't take care of yourself?" In one sense, wouldn't we all? The inquiry moves on to
treatment by asking if the limitations imposed by the applicant's condition are reduced or
ameliorated by "ongoing therapy or treatment (with or without medication) or because
you participate in a monitoring program or another support system (including A.A., N.A.
etc.)?" Id. Moreover, this inquiry about support groups for recovering substance abusers
could require affirmative answers from applicants who have been drug-free and sober for
years or even decades.
239. See, e.g., Applicants v. Tex. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, No. A93 CA 740 SS, 1994
WL 923404, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 1994) (asserting that those who answer untruthfully
will not be identified, which makes the question ineffective).
240. Herr, supra note 4, at 658-59 ("In reality, candidates seem to be engaging in mass
noncompliance, a form of 'questionnaire nullification,' as they resist undue governmental
scrutiny into their private lives."). Professor Herr goes on to lament:
While this Article does not condone dishonesty in completing bar applications,
there is something dysfunctional with a system that throws its net so wide that
only a handful of candidates answer 'yes' to questions that epidemiological
studies suggest would require hundreds of candidates to affirm their past or
present disability.
Id. at 658 n.102; see Clark v. Va. Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 880 F.Supp. 430, 437 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(observing that expert testimony indicated that "approximately twenty percent of the
population suffers from some form of mental or emotional disorder at any given time,"
but fewer than one percent of bar applicants answered "yes" to mental health questions on
application"); Bauer, supra note 26, at 105 (reporting that only two and one-half percent
of Connecticut bar applicants disclosed mental health treatment, but general health
statistics suggest the percentage "was undoubtedly much higher," and concluding that
"many bar applicants regarded the broad mental health inquiry as an illegitimate
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candor, may overdisclose, reporting any condition that is arguably a
limitation.41 In any event, if the condition or disorder significantly
impairs the applicant's functioning (judgment, motivation, impulse
control, cognition, ability to meet deadlines, and the like), questions
about conduct are likely to tip examiners off to any problems.
It is also true that self-assessment impairment questions do not
detect applicants who are unaware of (or in denial about) the
existence or significance of an untreated disorder. This, however, is
equally true of questions about diagnoses or treatment. In the end, a
question about impairment is preferable to questions about diagnoses
or treatment for two reasons. First, it does not discourage evaluation
or treatment; and second, it does not suffer the startling overbreadth
of questions about diagnoses and treatment. An inquiry into current
impairment focuses on the very thing the Board is charged with
detecting: current unfitness.
4. Ask About Conduct, Not Status
This brings us to the final model: ask no questions about the past
or present existence of, diagnoses of, or treatment for mental
disorders. Instead, screen bar applicants for character and fitness
solely through questions about their behavior and conduct. Several
state bars have adopted this approach. 42 This approach, advised the
late Professor Stanley Herr, is "[i]n many ways ... the more
intrusion, and resisted it by just saying 'no' ").
241. See generally Tex. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs v. Malloy, 793 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. App.
1990) (acknowledging that plaintiff's answers to board questions overdisclosed personal
information in response to application questions).
242. Massachusetts, Illinois, and Pennsylvania are among the states that have adopted
this approach. See generally COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. BD. OF EXAM'RS, FIRST TIME
APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR (making no inquiries regarding mental
illnesses), http://www.state.ma.us/bbe/ BBEDocs.htm (last visited May 14, 2003) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review); ILL. BD. OF ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
CHARACTER AND FITNESS REGISTRATION APPLICATION (asking no questions about
diagnosis, treatment or impairment from mental disorders), http://www.ibaby.org/forms.
html#exam-app (last visited May 14, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review);
PA. BD. OF LAW EXAM'RS, APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO SIT FOR THE
PENNSYLVANIA. BAR EXAMINATION (having no questions regarding mental illnesses on
the bar application form), http://www.pabarexam.org/ApplicationInformation/
Applications/Applications. htm (last visited May 14, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review). Illinois does include a catchall question asking for "any additional
information with respect to possible misconduct or lack of moral qualifications or general
fitness on your part which is not otherwise disclosed" by answers to other questions. ILL.
BD. OF ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, CHARACTER AND FITNESS REGISTRATION
APPLICATION, http://www.ibaby.org/ forms.html#exam.app (last visited July 10, 2003) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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principled and practical one. '243  The Board's legitimate fitness
concern is how a lawyer behaves, not how she feels. Psychiatric
diagnoses, as discussed above, often reflect subjective distress or
unhappiness, not objective functioning.2" The same is true for
treatment, as in the case of the lawyer who asks her therapist, "I just
negotiated the largest settlement in our firm's history, so why am I
not happy?" Matters like these are the province of therapists, not
professional licensing boards. If a person has maintained and
continues to maintain an adequate degree of functioning, that is all
that matters for licensing: she is fit. It is of no consequence what
health conditions she might be managing, what obstacles she has
surmounted, or what positive supports help her sustain her
functioning, be they strong family relations, antidepressants, prayer,
twelve-step programs, yoga, psychological counseling, kickboxing, or
some combination of these or other supports.
The proper focus of the fitness screening is circumscribed: Does
this applicant's current impairment compromise her ability to practice
law competently? How the applicant has handled her own affairs-
financial, professional, legal, personal, and public-is the best
indication of how she will handle her clients' matters. If her conduct
reflects responsibility, strength, intellectual achievement, and respect
for the law and the rights of others, the Board has no need (and
consequently, no right) to pry into her private or inner life. If, on the
other hand, her conduct, as reported on the bar exam application,
reveals a recent trail of disarray, delinquency, and professional
dysfunction, the Board has every reason to conclude that she poses a
risk that warrants further inquiry. That risk exists, whether or not it is
associated with a disorder.
Asking about conduct has other virtues. It emphasizes
accountability and personal responsibility, which at times may require
the responsible decision to seek mental health treatment. In so doing,
it rewards, rather than penalizes, applicants who have the maturity
and judgment to seek mental health services when they need them.
We thus extend to aspiring lawyers the same respect and professional
expectations that we confer upon admitted lawyers. Finally, focusing
243. Herr, supra note 4, at 672-73. Herr also promoted this approach as consistent
with the ADA's bar on pre-offer medical inquiries by private employers and with law
schools' abandonment of such inquiries in their applications. Id. He maintained that the
questions should be discontinued at least until bar examiners meet their burden of
proving, by scientifically convincing evidence, the effectiveness of and need for such
questions. Id. at 673.
244. See supra note 228.
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on conduct, not on treatment, has the virtue of consistency. The Bar
has made the considered judgment that respecting the confidential
nature of mental health treatment is the most effective way to
encourage its members to seek early treatment and thus to avoid
impairment or unfitness. All available evidence confirms that the
same holds true for bar applicants.
CONCLUSION
The Board of Law Examiners, on behalf of the North Carolina
Bar, performs a necessary and valuable service by assessing the
character and fitness of each person who seeks to enter the
profession. This character and fitness review can and should express
the profession's high standards and the principles it embraces:
respect for the law and for individuals, the repudiation of prejudices
and discriminatory stereotypes, an ethic of personal and professional
responsibility, and an unwavering commitment to fairness and
decency.
The mental health inquiries on North Carolina's current bar
application do not reflect those ideals or even satisfy the Bar's legal
obligations. First, there is no evidence that they serve their
fundamental purpose: identifying unfit applicants whose reported
behavior and conduct do not otherwise reveal their dysfunction.
Second, they inflict significant harm on the prospective lawyers who
are required to disclose to strangers private and sometimes painful
personal information not reasonably related to their present fitness to
practice law. Third, to compound these problems, the questions
themselves further stigmatize people with mental disorders. Finally,
by probing into counseling and other mental health treatment, they
deter law students and other applicants from seeking needed
treatment.
We can do better. The North Carolina Bar has demonstrated its
commitment to reducing lawyer impairment through education,
outreach, confidential support, and timely intervention. The Bar now
has the opportunity-and the obligation-to extend this model to our
future colleagues about to enter the profession. Thoughtful revisions
of the applicant screening process can create a situation in which
everybody wins. Bar applicants, spared painful investigations into
personal matters that are remote and irrelevant to their current
fitness to practice law, would be freer to seek treatment they consider
necessary or desirable. The Board and its staff would obtain, through
detailed responses to conduct-related questions, ample information to
assess an applicant's current fitness while being spared the task of
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sorting through treatment histories of those applicants whose
behavior presents no reason to question their fitness. The Bar would
be able to convey to applicants its belief in the importance of
treatment and intervention for mental disorders. Finally, to the
extent that the revised process encourages more prospective lawyers
to seek needed treatment, the public would be doubly rewarded.
Their lawyers would be more aware of their own needs and
limitations and better equipped to maintain their mental fitness
throughout their careers. Those same lawyers would also be more
likely to understand, and less likely to stigmatize, the mental
conditions or impairments that touch the lives of their clients.
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